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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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Doctor of Philosophy in Management
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Professor Felipe Caro, Chair
When we think about Operations Management and Business Analytics, we think about
optimization, efficiency, algorithms, optimality, profits and costs, exact quantitative analyses,
etc. However, the field was created by humans and for humans. So what is the role of humans
in the process of operational decision-making? In this dissertation, we study two aspects of
the interface between humans and operational decision making, in the context of the apparel
industry. The first part (Chapter 1) is related to social responsibility, i.e., how operational
decision making affects workers, communities, and society. The second part (Chapters 2 and
3) shows how human biases affect operational decision-making.
In the first chapter, we study unauthorized subcontracting, i.e., when suppliers outsource
part of their production to a third party without the retailer’s consent. This practice has
been common practice in the apparel industry and it is often tied to non-compliant working
conditions. Since retailers are unaware of the third party, the production process becomes
obscure and cannot be tracked adequately. We present an empirical study of the factors
that can lead suppliers to engage in unauthorized subcontracting. We use data provided by
a global supply chain manager with over 30,000 orders, of which 36% were subcontracted
without authorization. Our results show that there are different factory types, ranging from
factories that used unauthorized third parties for all of their orders to factories that used
none. Moreover, the degree of unauthorized subcontracting in the past is highly related to
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the probability of engaging in unauthorized subcontracting in the future, which suggests
that factories behave as if they choose a strategic level of unauthorized subcontracting. At
the order level, we find that state dependence (i.e., the status of an order carrying over to
the next one) followed by price pressure are the key drivers of unauthorized subcontracting.
Buyer reputation and factory specialization can also play a role, whereas the size of an order
shows no effect. We find that the main effect (state dependence) is tied to factory utilization.
Finally, we show that unauthorized subcontracting can be predicted correctly for more than
80% of the orders in out-of-sample tests. This indicates that retailers can use business
analytics to predict unauthorized subcontracting and help prevent it from happening.
In the second chapter, we study the adherence to the recommendations of a decision
support system (DSS) for markdowns during clearance sales. The DSS was implemented at
Zara, the Spanish fast fashion retailer. Managers’ initial adherence was low, which motivated
two interventions: 1. showing a revenue metric; and 2. showing a reference point for that
metric. We use data collected by Zara during seven clearance sales campaigns to analyze the
effect of the two interventions and the behavioral drivers of managers’ adherence decisions.
Intervention 1 did not significantly alter managers’ adherence, but Intervention 2 increased it,
and also decreased their likelihood to mark a product down when DSS recommended keeping
its price unchanged. Managers were more likely to adhere to the DSS’s recommendations
when the suggested price was aligned with the heuristic they followed before the DSS was
implemented. Managers’ decisions were consistent with inventory minimization, as opposed
to revenue maximization. Higher salvage values were related to higher adherence, but also to
larger deviations when managers did not adhere. Managers were minimizing the number of
different prices to set and basing their pricing decisions on metrics that were aggregated at
the group level, instead of at the individual product level. These findings can be explained
by preference for the status quo, salience of the inventory (compared to a revenue forecast),
loss aversion, and inattention. Some of these biases were mitigated after the interventions.
Our findings provide insights on how to increase voluntary adherence that can be used in
any context in which a company wants an analytical tool to be adopted by its users.
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In Chapter 3, we continue to study pricing decision making by country managers at
Zara. We aim to disentangle managers’ degree of loss aversion from other behavioral biases
by building a structural model to replicate managers’ price decision making process and
fitting it using data collected by Zara prior to the DSS’s implementation. In our model,
managers choose prices to maximize their utility over the whole season, subject to a number
of constraints given by the firm’s pricing rules. The utility function consists of a revenue
component and a loss aversion component that depends on a loss aversion parameter. Both
components include demand uncertainty and contain all products of the same type (shirts,
pants, etc.). This model is, therefore, a dynamic program over a finite horizon with a large
state space and uncertainty set. We use a certainty equivalent for the demand function,
and discretize the problem, given that the set of available prices is discrete. Our model
thus becomes a mixed integer linear program. We find, for each value of the loss aversion
parameter, its corresponding set of utility-maximizing prices, and then pick the value of
the parameter that best fits the prices that managers implemented. We then compare their
degree of loss aversion across product groups (e.g. fashion or basic products) and across
country managers. Preliminary results using a very small dataset suggest that country
managers at Zara are, indeed, loss averse, but some managers are more so than others.
There seem to be no clear pattern on what product types trigger loss aversion in managers.
Our model explains managers’ observed prices 11% better than if we assume they are pure
revenue maximizers, and several times better than if we model them as inventory minimizers.
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Dedicated to all the brave individuals who are, right now, thinking about starting a great
adventure, but are hesitant because they think they are not smart enough, not strong
enough, not good enough. You are much smarter, stronger and better than you think.
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CHAPTER 1
Can Brands Claim Ignorance? Unauthorized
Subcontracting in Apparel Supply Chains
1.1. Introduction
“Lack of transparency costs lives. It is impossible for companies to make sure human rights are
respected and that environmental practices are sound without knowing where their products are
made, who is making them and under what conditions. If you can’t see it, you don’t know it’s going
on and you can’t fix it.”(Moore et al. 2016)
The Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh in April 2013, which killed 1,129 people, showed to
the international community the non-compliant working conditions of many apparel workers
in developing countries. The major brands that had ongoing production at the Rana Plaza
claimed that they had not placed their orders to any of those factories directly (Kerppola
et al. 2014). This was not an isolated event. A few months earlier, a fire in the Tazreen
Fashion factory in the outskirts of Dhaka, Bangladesh, killed more than 100 workers. Prod-
ucts for a large U.S. retailer were found at the Tarzeen facility, and though these garments
were part of an order that had been placed at an authorized factory, they ended up at the
location of the fire due to unauthorized subcontracting (Donaldson 2015). Over a decade,
more than 1,800 apparel workers died in Bangladesh due to workplace disasters mostly at
unauthorized factories (Clifford and Greenhouse 2013). Despite multiple efforts launched
following these disasters, the intricate network of unauthorized subcontractors continues to
exist (Drennan 2015), which is concerning for supply chains because of the risk that the
subcontractors might be non-compliant.
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The lack of visibility from unauthorized subcontracting allows for obscure practices, espe-
cially non-compliant working conditions. These practices have been endemic to the apparel
industry in developing countries for decades. The issue got worldwide attention with the
incidents in Bangladesh. However, many other incidents – possibly smaller in magnitude
but no less grave – have been reported in almost every developing country where apparel
manufacturing takes place. For instance, in China there was a recent case of a factory that
diverted production of a major Australian brand to a facility in North Korea where forced
labor was employed (McKenzie and Baker 2016). In Vietnam, a flurry of garments destined
for suppliers of multinational companies were being produced under degrading conditions in
detention centers (Theuws 2015). In Cambodia, a factory with unsafe working conditions
was in the spotlight but the brands linked to the factory dodged the blame saying that
the orders had been rerouted without their permission (Robertson and Heng 2014). These
examples are limited to the cases that have been caught by the press. The actual number
of incidents may be much larger.
Although most companies are already actively involved in improving suppliers’ working
conditions through codes of conduct, auditing, adherence to domestic and international
regulations, etc., the complex nature of supply chains in the apparel industry makes it
very difficult for retailers to track where their products are actually manufactured. It often
occurs that a supplier subcontracts an order to a non-compliant third party without the
buyer’s authorization or even knowledge. As a consequence, despite the multiple efforts
from retailers, many violations of building codes and labor standards remain unnoticed by
the retailers. Of course, it is entirely possible that a supplier subcontracts an order to
another factory in the retailer’s network of trusted suppliers, and so the third party doing
the work happens to be audited and compliant as well. However, once an order has been
subcontracted without authorization, the buyer loses visibility and, therefore, it is impossible
to monitor the actual conditions in which the order has been produced.
In this paper, we propose two research questions. First, what are the main drivers of
unauthorized subcontracting? Second, can brands claim ignorance? In other words, when
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unauthorized subcontracting takes place, could retailers have anticipated it and, therefore,
prevented it?
To find a response to the first question, we run an empirical study to analyze the factors
that lead to unauthorized subcontracting using data from a middleman that matches retail-
ers with suppliers in several developing countries. The data spans eight months in 2013-14
and consists of 32,477 orders from 226 factories delivered to 30 buyers. Unauthorized sub-
contracting is reported in 36.3% of the orders in our sample. However, we find that there are
big differences among factories. We observe three consistent patterns. For some factories,
there is no incidence of unauthorized subcontracting; for others, it occurs in 100% of the
orders; and, for a third group of factories, it happens occasionally. Most importantly, the
propensity of each firm to engage in unauthorized subcontracting emerges as an inherent
characteristic or strategic choice that can be (partially) inferred from past behavior.
We argue that factories’ unauthorized subcontracting behavior exhibits state dependence
(Heckman 1981, Wooldridge 2010). Hence, a factory that just delivered an order that was
subcontracted without authorization is more likely to do the same for the next order. We
validate this hypothesis by testing whether unauthorized subcontracting is autoregressive.
The result is large in magnitude and is statistically significant. We find that the chance of
unauthorized subcontracting increases by 83%, i.e., almost doubles, when the previous order
at the same factory was also subcontracted without authorization. Then we demonstrate that
the state dependence effect is stronger when the factory utilization is higher. Based on the
extant literature, we hypothesize three additional order-level characteristics that could drive
unauthorized subcontracting: price pressure, buyer reputation, and factory specialization.
We find ample empirical support for price pressure but only partial evidence for the other
two. The effect of price pressure leads to more unauthorized subcontracting when the unit
price of an order is below the historic baseline for a given category and factory. For instance,
the likelihood of unauthorized subcontracting increases by 11% when the price is 25% lower
than usual. Note that our data was collected after the Rana Plaza collapse, which increased
the worldwide scrutiny on unauthorized subcontracting. Therefore, our estimates are most
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likely lower compared to a business-as-usual scenario.
For the second research question we use a simple linear prediction model to detect unau-
thorized subcontracting at the order level. The model leverages our findings on the drivers of
unauthorized subcontracting. Hence, it includes a factory (fixed) effect and order character-
istics such as price pressure. We partition the data in training and testing subsamples and
we find that more than 82% of the test orders can be correctly predicted using the model
calibrated with the training data set. Depending on the data availability, the prediction
accuracy can be above 90%. Moreover, the proportion of false positives (type I errors) and
false negatives (type II errors) in the out-of-sample tests are well balanced. These results
are robust to the training and testing data split, which indicates that, to a great extent,
unauthorized subcontracting is predictable, and therefore, can be managed.
Our work contributes to the literature on supplier compliance and supply chain visibility.
The goal of the study is not to incite finger-pointing between brands and suppliers but rather
demonstrate that the use of data and models can help in addressing the issue of unauthorized
subcontracting. For instance, some variation of our models can be embedded in a decision
support system and the likelihood of unauthorized subcontracting can be measured for each
order-factory pair, which can help inform the decision on where to place orders. Our results
also show the need for more collaboration between buyers and suppliers. Though price is
always important, we find that working closely with the supplier to avoid situations (or
states) that push the factory into unauthorized subcontracting can be even more effective.
For instance, coordinated planning and scheduling can prevent periods of excessive workload.
On the other hand, supply chain visibility can be increased by streamlining the process to
authorize suppliers. In this paper we focus on building compliance but our findings could
apply to other types of compliance that suffer from unauthorized subcontracting.
In the remainder of the paper, USC is used as short for unauthorized subcontracting.
The sole term “subcontracting” will be used as a synonym of “unauthorized subcontracting”
when the latter is implied by the context. In addition, “supplier” and ”factory” will be used
interchangeably as all of the factories in our data belong to different firms (suppliers).
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1.2. Literature Review
Unauthorized subcontracting, before the Rana Plaza collapse, did not have much attention in
the academic literature. However, two streams of literature are closely related to this topic:
on the one hand, papers related to compliance with environmental and safety standards; on
the other hand, papers related to supply chain design. For a general review on sustainable
operations management, see Drake and Spinler (2013).
What determines factories’ compliance level? Some factors listed in the literature are
external to suppliers and policy-related, such as differences between countries, related to
differences in regulations, inspections and freedom of press (Toffel et al. 2015). In addition
to the social characteristics of the supplier’s location and regulation levels, compliance levels
are also related to the characteristics of supplier-buyer relationships and their degree of
involvement, and to strategic decisions such as the adoption of lean manufacturing standards
(Locke et al. 2009, Distelhorst et al. 2016). In China, severe price pressure from Western
buyers, short-term opportunism, lack of observability, and corruption and passiveness in the
government are factors that induce suppliers to adulterate their products (Tang and Babich
2014). Some operational drivers of compliance and violations of labor standards are price
pressure, production complexity and supplier-buyer contract duration (Jiang 2009). We
study unauthorized subcontracting as a special case of compliance, and focus mainly on its
operational drivers, but on an order-to-order basis, to observe how subcontracting decisions
change under different order characteristics and workload levels.
A large part of the literature on compliance is focused on inspections and audits. Inspec-
tions can decrease the incentive for the supplier to adulterate products (Babich and Tang
2012). However, they can also be counterproductive since they can induce suppliers to a lack
of transparency (Locke et al. 2007). In some circumstances, scheduled inspections are more
efficient than random ones as an incentive for the firm to disclose environmental violations
(Kim 2015). Among the papers on the effect of inspections in compliance, one is particularly
related to our work: Plambeck and Taylor (2016), who analyze the effects of audits on com-
pliance with labor and environmental standards, and on unauthorized subcontracting. They
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show that the potential for a supplier to pass an audit through hiding reduces the optimal
level of auditing for the buyer when either the margin or the buyer’s damage for sourcing
with violations are small. Their results hold for the case of unauthorized subcontrating:
when the supplier will likely be able to hide that it is subcontracting, more auditing from
the buyer can backfire and cause the supplier to exert more effort in hiding its subcontracting
practices than in avoiding subcontracting altogether.
Incentives and penalties to increase environmental and social compliance have been vastly
studied. Incentives have a higher effect than penalties in violation reduction (Porteous et al.
2015). Some mechanisms that can prevent suppliers from adulterating their products, in ad-
dition to inspections, are deferred payments (Babich and Tang 2012). Chen and Lee (2016)
examine the interactions of three instruments to increase compliance (supplier certification,
audits, and contingency payments) and find that they are complementary and, when used
jointly, supplier screening becomes more effective, and sourcing costs decrease. The relation-
ship type with the buyer, country, age, and degree of asset specialization are some factors
that determine the incentives for suppliers to adhere to environmental standards when buyers
request it (Delmas and Montiel 2009). If we focus on buyers, brand visibility and value, serv-
ing for European markets, and the density of NGOs in the country where the buyer has its
headquarters increase its sustainable sourcing practices (Thorlakson et al. 2018). Suppliers
are more likely to be compliant if they are in more regulated countries, with higher freedom
of press, and producing for buyers which are based in wealthier countries with socially aware
consumers (Toffel et al. 2015). In our paper, in addition to price, we find an effect of buyer’s
popularity, i.e., unauthorized subcontracting is less likely when the buyer is a major brand
that can suffer reputation damage.
Regarding supply chain structure, Orsdemir et al. (2015) find the optimal vertical inte-
gration and compliance enforcement decision as a function of both the probability and the
economic impact of the public disclosure of a violation of standards. They conclude that
supply chain partnership can greatly improve an industry’s compliance. Different sourcing
policies and the influence of supplier competition on the supplier’s willingness to switch to
6
a sustainable process are studied in Agrawal and Lee (2016), who show that, when sourc-
ing from a unique supplier, buyers should require them to switch but, in the presence of
supplier competition, a the buyer should adopt a sustainability-preferred policy, as opposed
to sustainability-required. Greater downstream competition, a more concentrated supplier
base, and a less flexible supply chain make a retailer more likely to source responsibly (Guo
et al. 2016). In a multi-tier supply chain, increased pressure from external stakeholders
(consumers, NGOs, and governments) can decrease supply chain responsibility when the
manufacturer shifts from direct monitoring all the supply chain to delegating such inspec-
tions (Huang et al. 2017). However, all these works refer to supply chains in which all the
tiers are known to the buyer, as opposed to our work, in which buyers are not aware of the
existence of second tier suppliers.
1.3. Research Setting
1.3.1 Data Collection.
The data for this paper was obtained from M., a global supply chain manager (or “middle-
man”) located in Asia that links buyers to suppliers and supervises the whole production
process. The middleman groups the buyer accounts in different lines of business. The
dataset used in our analysis represents all the orders in one line of business B., which is
mostly mass-market apparel products for (lesser-known) brands in North America. The
buyers and product categories in this line of business are further described in Tables 1.3 and
1.4.
The middleman maintains a list of authorized factories. These are factories that have
passed a building compliance inspection. The middleman also performs a conformity audit
of each order to ensure that it meets the agreed specifications.1 The conformity audits of the
orders are independent from the compliance inspection of the facilities. The latter happen
1According to ISO 9000:2005 definition 3.6.1, conformity is fulfillment of a requirement. In this paper we
reserve the term “conformity” for order-level requirements and we use the term “compliance” for factory-level
adherence to (established) building regulations.
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infrequently (e.g., once a year) and are performed by building inspectors. In contrast, the
conformity audits are performed by employees of the middleman for each order. These
audits are usually preannounced and scheduled during the order production or soon after its
completion.
After the Rana Plaza collapse, the line of business B. decided to record when orders were
subcontracted to unauthorized factories, i.e., factories that were not on the authorized list.
This information was gathered during the routine conformity audit of each order. Suppliers
were not aware that their subcontracting practices were being recorded and no penalty was
applied.2 Hence, it is safe to assume that the data is reliable as there was no incentive for
factories to hide occurrences of unauthorized subcontracting. However, the data does not
contain any information on who the subcontractor was and the date of the conformity audit
was not recorded. There is no information either on any orders that the factories produced
for other buyers outside our dataset, but Table 1.2 shows that the line of business B. used a
large portion of the factory capacity available.
1.3.2 Data Description.
Our data consists of all the orders delivered by the line of business B. in the eight months
between October 2013 and May 2014. There are 32,477 orders that span 226 factories, 30
buyers, and 34 categories. An order represents one observation in our dataset and it is
defined as a purchase request of a SKU from a buyer to a supplier through the middleman.
The data contains many characteristics of each order and of the factory that processed it,
as well as the identification of the buyer. There is also a binary variable (USC) stating
whether or not the order was subcontracted without authorization (YES=1). A sample of
an observation (order) is given in Table 1.1.
Note that noncompliance can only happen at unauthorized facilities, as was the case in
all the disasters described in §1.1, but not all unauthorized facilities are necessarily non-
2If the order was subcontracted, the supplier would tell the conformity auditor where it had been sent.
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compliant. In other words, noncompliance implies USC but the converse implication is not
necessarily true. Hence, USC is not a direct measure of noncompliance but rather should be
seen as a proxy for increased compliance risk. Alternatively, an incident of USC can be seen
as a lack of supply chain visibility.
An additional data set corresponding to orders delivered between November 2010 and
October 2013 was also available. However, it did not contain any information on USC, but
just order characteristics. This second dataset was used to compute the historical prices and
specialization of each factory.
Factory ID Factory capacity Factory country Buyer ID Product category
XXXXXX 105 units/month Vietnam YYYYYY Sleepwear
Quantity Price PO date Scheduled due date Delivery date
144 units ZZZ USD/unit 2013-09-10 2013-12-12 2013-12-12
Unauthorized subcontracting (USC)
YES
Table 1.1: Example of one order. The factory, buyer and price information have been
disguised.
Figure 1.1 shows a histogram of the percent of orders that each factory subcontracted
without authorization. As shown in the figure, unauthorized subcontracting behavior is not
evenly distributed among factories. Whilst some factories never subcontracted any order
(Type A), others decided to subcontract on an order-to-order basis (Type B), and a third
group of factories subcontracted all of their production (Type C). As we will explain in
Section 1.4 and 1.5, the differences in unauthorized subcontracting behavior imply that we
must account for managerial decisions at the factory level, and not only for the characteristics
of the orders that the factories received. Table 1.2 reports summary statistics of the factories.
From this table it can be seen that most of the factories are located in China and they
produced orders for 1.4 buyers on average. Though we do not have information on other
buyers that the factories might have work with, Table 1.2 shows that the workload due to
orders from the middleman represents 42.6% of the factory’s capacity on average, with a
large standard deviation.
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Mean St. dev. Min. Max. % Factories % Orders % USC
Factory descriptive statistics:
Capacity (monthly units) 388,929 864,181 10,000 10,000,000 - - -
Two-month utilization (%) 42.6 60.7 0.3 531.9 - - -
Number of categories produced 2.8 2.1 1 10 - - -
Number of buyers served 1.4 1.0 1 11 - - -
Orders delivered 143.7 270.6 1 2,772 - - -
Order delivery delay (days) 1.1 7.6 -84 141 - - -
Order size (units) 2,508 5,824 1 240,491 - - -
Orders from major brands (%) 1.9 10.4 0 100 - - -
Factory type:
Type A - Never subcontracted - - - - 56.6 35.7 0.0
Type B - Sometimes subcontracted - - - - 31.9 57.9 51.6
Type C - Always subcontracted - - - - 11.5 6.4 100.0
Factory location:
Bangladesh - - - - 10.6 12.8 0.1
Cambodia - - - - 5.8 5.4 52.0
China - - - - 59.7 54.8 47.9
Indonesia - - - - 6.6 13.1 16.0
Vietnam - - - - 9.3 9.1 54.4
Other - - - - 8.0 4.9 4.6
Table 1.2: Description of the factories. Two-month utilization is the workload divided by the
factory’s capacity for two-month subperiods, see 1.5.3. Order delivery delay is the difference
between the actual and scheduled delivery dates. A major brand is one that has its own
stores and website, see Section 1.4.4. The factory types are defined in Figure 1.1. %USC is
the frequency of USC.
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Figure 1.1: Histogram of percent of subcontracted orders by factory. The light bar, grey
bars, and black bar correspond to 128, 72, and 26 factories, respectively.
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics of the buyers. It can be seen that, on average, the
buyers ordered products in 3.4 categories and they worked with 10.7 different factories. The
vast majority of the orders are coming from buyers located in North America, and most of
the buyers represent brands that do not have their own stores or website. These smaller
brands are more likely to use the middleman M. for most of their sourcing, though there
is no exclusivity agreement in place. Finally, Table 1.4 contains a list of the top product
categories in the data.
1.4. Hypotheses
The dependent variable in our analysis is the binary variable USCij that equals 1 if unautho-
rized subcontracting occurred, i.e., it equals 1 when order j of supplier i was subcontracted
to a factory that was not on the authorized list of the middleman M. We propose four hy-
potheses to explain the main drivers of USCij that we test using the variables described
below. Note that the academic literature on unauthorized subcontracting is meager, so we
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Mean St. dev. Min. Max. % Buyers % Orders % USC
Buyer descriptive statistics:
Orders placed 1,082.6 2,387.5 1 9,652 - - -
Number of product categories ordered 3.4 3.3 1 11 - - -
Number of factories engaged with 10.7 17.6 1 61 - - -
Buyer recognition:
Major brand (has own stores and website) - - - - 46.7 2.2 5.9
Not major brand - - - - 53.3 97.8 37.0
Buyer location:
North America - - - - 63.4 99.3 36.6
Asia - - - - 13.3 0.2 0.0
Europe - - - - 10.0 0.2 0.0
Other - - - - 13.3 0.3 0.0
Table 1.3: Description of the buyers. The product categories are described in Table 1.4.
% Orders % Units # Factories # Buyers % USC
Bottoms 6.8 9.7 72 9 44.8
Dresses 3.2 1.9 35 8 39.5
Jackets 1.6 1.2 32 8 52.4
Pants 8.3 7.1 79 8 34.7
Polos 6.2 6.1 25 7 60.5
Sets 11.8 11.1 42 2 65.0
Shirts 17.0 8.7 63 22 23.3
Sleepwear 6.8 11.5 12 4 21.0
Swimwear 3.0 2.8 13 2 21.8
Tops 19.8 23.7 126 11 32.0
T-shirts 6.5 3.9 33 8 19.4
Other 9.1 12.2 97 14 35.7
Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics of the top 11 product categories by number of orders. #
Factories is the number of factories that produced products in a category. # Buyers is the
number of buyers that placed orders in a category.
12
support some of our hypotheses drawing from the related literature on compliance of labor
and safety standards.
1.4.1 State Dependence
Hypothesis 1. Unauthorized subcontracting is more likely when the previous order in the
same factory was subcontracted.
A factory can be seen as a queueing system in which the state is given by the queue
length or workload. When a factory is operating close to capacity there is pressure to engage
in unauthorized subcontracting to satisfy scheduled delivery dates (Labowitz and Baumann-
Pauly 2014, 2015). Hence, an order is more likely to be diverted to an unauthorized facility
when the workload is high than when it is low. For this reason, we argue that unauthorized
subcontracting exhibits state dependence.
The excessive workloads are caused by several factors. First, more orders means more
business, which eventually translates into higher revenues. Second, rejecting an order can
set a precedent and factories might fear that the buyer will not place orders there in the
future. Third, the market is changing rapidly: tighter lead times, late sample approval and
last-minute alterations to product specifications put increased pressure on factories, e.g.,
buyers will often delay their purchasing decisions until the last minute to be able to observe
and react to what their competitors do (Ashida and Plinke 2004, Vaughan-Whitehead and
Pinedo Caro 2017). Fourth, some factories exhibit poor production planning, such as lack of
awareness of the critical path and inaccurate forecasting of the necessary time to complete
an order (Hurst et al. 2005). Finally, buyers that have invested in improving the compliance
of their suppliers inadvertently make those suppliers more attractive to other “free-riding”
buyers that will also want to place their orders there (Greenhouse 2013, Plambeck and Taylor
2016).
In our dataset, we do not observe queueing levels at the arrival time of each order.
However, we can expect unauthorized subcontracting to present an autoregressive behavior.
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Indeed, consecutive orders face similar queue lengths, especially when the system utilization
is high. For instance, in the classic M/M/1 queue, the chance that an incoming order
finds a queue longer than the previous order is
ρ
1 + ρ
and this probability is increasing in
the utilization level ρ. Therefore, if order j − 1 at a given factory is subcontracted in an
unauthorized manner, then we expect the likelihood of unauthorized subcontracting for order
j to increase, all else remaining equal.
We test this hypothesis by introducing an autoregressive term USCi,j−1 in our regression
model. We also include factory fixed effects and several sets of dummies in order to distin-
guish between structural and spurious dependence (Heckman 1981). We acknowledge that,
in addition to utilization, there can be other causes of state dependence. Suppliers could
be reserving capacity for other buyers for which we lack visibility, or might be affected by
the overall financial health of the company. Though we cannot completely rule out these
alternative explanations, in §1.5.3 we strengthen our point by looking more closely at the
role of factory utilization.
1.4.2 Price Pressure
Hypothesis 2. Unauthorized subcontracting is more likely for orders that have a lower unit
price.
A lower price makes an order less profitable and could give the supplier incentives to
divert it to an unauthorized third party which has lower production costs by being non-
compliant. This is a common view in the public press (Goodman 2013) and is supported
by industry-wide surveys (Vaughan-Whitehead and Pinedo Caro 2017). Several studies in
the academic literature report results linking price pressure to non-compliant behavior. For
instance, Jiang (2009) reports that price pressure is one of the main reasons that led to
violations of supplier codes of conduct. Similarly, Tang and Babich (2014) mention that
pressure from Western manufacturers to deliver products at persistently lower prices is a
crucial factor that pushes Chinese suppliers to “cut corners” and adulterate products. In
contrast, the work by Plambeck and Taylor (2016) shows that, under a certain backfiring
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condition, price pressure could lead to less unauthorized subcontracting, which could seem to
run against Hypothesis 2. However, the backfiring condition is unlikely to hold in our setting
since there was no additional compliance inspection effort when the data was collected and
unauthorized subcontracting was not penalized.
We measure price pressure by comparing the unit price of an order with the moving-
average in same factory and category. Specifically, let Priceij be the unit price of order
j at factory i. Let c(j) be the product category of order j and let P
c(j)
i be the average
price for category c(j) at factory i. Then we define the continuous variable RelPriceFCij =
Priceij − P c(j)i
P
c(j)
i
. To compute P ci (j) we used all the orders of category c(j) delivered by
factory i during the calendar year prior to the delivery date of order j. Note that the
definition of RelPriceFCij is consistent with the notion of price pressure described in Jiang
(2009) where factory managers felt pressure when the price they were paid for an order was
lower than their usual price for that type of product. We test alternative measures of price
pressure as robustness checks in §1.5.4.
1.4.3 Factory Specialization
Hypothesis 3. Unauthorized subcontracting is more likely for orders of product categories
other than the factory’s main specialization.
In the strategy literature it is well understood that specialization can be a source of
competitive advantage (Dyer 1996). Moreover, production switchovers are costly in a multi-
product manufacturing setting and are hard to manage (Rosa-Hatko and Gunn 1997, Cheng
et al. 2000), which reinforces the specialization in a smaller set of products. Once a factory
is specialized, activities that are outside its core are natural candidates to be outsourced
to a third party. The tendency to outsource non-core activities is supported by the usual
outsourcing frameworks in operations strategy (Van Mieghem 2008).
The factories in our dataset exhibit a high degree of specialization. Table 1.2 shows
that the factories produce less than three product categories on average. Indeed, 73% of
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the factories produced at most three product categories, and only two factories produced 10
different product categories. Hence, we hypothesize that an order of a product category that
a factory does not produce very often may have a higher probability of being subcontracted
because it is outside the factory’s core activities. A complementary view is that the factory
might not have the technical capability or might simply want to avoid production switchovers,
so this specific order is more complex for the factory. Note that the degree of complexity is
specific to each factory-category pair. For instance, an order of pants may be complex for a
factory that is specialized in sweaters, but not complex for a factory that regularly produces
pants.
To measure factory specialization, we need to take into account what types of products
each factory produces more often. Hence, we define PropThisCategoryij as the proportion
of orders at factory i of the same category as order j during the calendar year prior to
when order j was delivered. We use the continuous variable PropThisCategoryij to test
Hypothesis 3.
1.4.4 Buyer Reputation
Hypothesis 4. Unauthorized subcontracting is less likely when the buyer is a well-known
brand.
The evidence in practice has demonstrated that stronger brands face a higher cost and
more reputation damage when disasters related to non-compliance occur. After the Rana
Plaza collapse, some of the famous retailers whose products were being made there had to
pay compensations to families of the victims (Butler 2014, Smithers 2015). There is also
evidence that “name and shame” schemes are more effective with high-profile brands (Lee
and Plambeck 2009). For instance, Apple agreed to monitor the pollution of its factories
after being exposed by the Institute of Public and Environment Affairs (IPE), which is a
nonprofit organization based in China (Nuttall 2012).
Given the evidence in practice, a standard assumption in supply chain compliance models
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is that the buyer faces a penalty or goodwill loss if the supplier commits a compliance
violation (Plambeck and Taylor 2016, Guo et al. 2016, Caro et al. 2016, Huang et al. 2017).
This penalty is higher for buyers that have more at stake and intuitively it should lead to
actions that induce the supplier to be more socially responsible. In fact, Plambeck and
Taylor (2016) in their model show that unauthorized subcontracting is less frequent when
the buyer has more at stake as long as compliance auditing efforts do not backfire.3 Similarly,
Huang et al. (2017) find that greater pressure focused on the retailer decreases the chance
of a violation in the supply chain.
We postulate that unauthorized subcontracting is less likely for an order placed by a
well-known brand. This could be because the well-known brand will exert a higher effort
in preventing irresponsible behavior, as in the single-period models cited above, or it could
simply be because the damage cost of the supplier is correlated with the violation penalty
faced by the buyer. Indeed, the supplier knows that, if a disaster happens, the attention
of the press will be higher for orders of well-known brands and any penalty faced by these
brands could spill over to her.
Some of the buyers placing orders to factories in our data correspond to major retailing
brands, while others are distributors or brands that are not as well-known to the public.
We define the binary variable BuyerIsMajorBrandij, which takes value 1 if the buyer
that placed order j at factory i has its own website and its own network of stores, and 0
otherwise. The buyers in our data which we labeled as major brands correspond to retailers
with hundreds of stores in multiple countries and an online store in their website, whereas
the other buyers sold through third-party retail channels, e.g., department stores.4 We use
the variable BuyerIsMajorBrandij to test Hypothesis 4.
3Proposition 12 in (Plambeck and Taylor 2016) requires that the supplier does not have incentives to hide
his behavior, which was the case in our setting.
4It is common in the literature to identify major buyers as those that are publicly traded. However, such
criteria does not discriminate in our setting because 99.8% of the orders were placed by publicly traded
companies.
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1.5. Methods and Results
1.5.1 Model Specification.
We propose the following linear regression model to explain unauthorized subcontracting:
USCij = αUSCi,j−1 + βxij + fi + εij, (1.1)
where fi are time-invariant factory fixed effects and εij is the error term. The vector
xij contains the independent variables used to test the hypotheses, i.e., RelPriceFCij,
PropThisCategoryij, and BuyerIsMajorBrandij, as well as the control LogOrderSizeij,
which is the logarithm of OrderSizeij, the size of order j at factory i. Table 1.5 shows
descriptive statistics of these variables. Collinearity is discussed in Appendix A.1.1.
Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
USC 0.363 0.481 0 1
RelPriceFC -0.008 0.249 -0.879 4.103
PropThisCategory 0.610 0.351 0.001 1
BuyerIsMajorBrand 0.022 0.147 0 1
LogOrderSize 6.696 1.626 0 12.390
Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
USC 0.516 0.500 0 1
RelPriceFC -0.011 0.263 -0.879 4.103
PropThisCategory 0.589 0.359 0.001 1
BuyerIsMajorBrand 0.019 0.135 0 1
LogOrderSize 6.665 1.605 0 12.390
Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics of the regression variables, using the full dataset (left) and
the subsample of type B factories (right).
We use a linear model in order to introduce multiple fixed effects. An alternative probit
model with random effects is described in Appendix A.1.4. The factory-level fixed effect fi in
Equation (1.1) captures the factory effect that is apparent in Figure 1.1 and it accounts for
the idiosyncratic baseline of unauthorized subcontracting of each factory, i.e., the factory’s
managerial decision on whether or not to subcontract at all, and if so, how often on average.
This (unobservable) fixed effect can also be viewed as the supplier’s intrinsic ethical level,
which is a common assumption in theoretical models (e.g., see Chen and Lee 2016). To
mitigate possible sources of omitted variable bias, we introduce additional dummy variables
for product category, delivery month, and buyer.5 Finally, factories may be strategic about
5When the dummies per buyer are introduced we have to drop the binary variable BuyerIsMajorBrandij
because they are collinear.
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which orders to subcontract depending on the order size. Therefore, we control for order size
using the variable LogOrderSizeij. We opt for a logarithmic form given the large variability
of order quantities.
Since the right hand side in Equation (1.1) has a lagged variable and a fixed effect, we rely
on the first difference equation ∆USCij = α∆USCi,j−1+β∆xij+∆εij and the Arellano-Bond
estimator (Wooldridge 2010, Greene 2003, Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 2010). Following the
Arellano-Bond approach, the correlation between ∆USCi,j−1 and ∆εij is addressed by using
USCi,j−2 as an instrumental variable (IV). This is a strong instrument, as ∆USCi,j−1 and
USCi,j−2 are highly correlated. It is also a valid one since it is uncorrelated with the error
term, insofar the errors ∆εij are not autocorrelated (we check the veracity of this assumption
in Appendix A.1.2).
There is a possibility of simultaneity between price and unauthorized subcontracting. If
either the buyer or the middleman have some visibility on a factory’s past unauthorized
subcontracting behavior, they will use this information to set the prices they offer, i.e., a
factory’s past subcontracting may affect the current prices of the orders it receives. For
instance, the buyer can decide to offer a low price for an order to a supplier if it suspects
that the supplier will likely subcontract it, and so it will be less costly to produce if not
all safety standards are met. To account for the possible endogeneity of the price pressure
variable, we also use an IV approach: RelPriceFCi,j−2 will serve as an instrument for
∆RelPriceFCi,j. Note that, to be able to include second lags of the dependent variable
and the price covariate as instruments, we need to remove the first two observations of each
factory from the regression.
The coefficients of the first-differences IV model were computed using generalized method
of moments in Stata 14.2. In Appendix A.1.4, we test the robustness of our results to a
different estimation technique, the two-step least squares (also called the Hsiao estimator).
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1.5.2 Main Results.
Table 1.6 shows the coefficient estimates of the Arellano-Bond regression. We show the
results for two data sets: (i) including all the factories in our data, and (ii) including only
type B factories (those that subcontracted some, but not all, of their orders). The reason for
running our regression using this subsample is that these are factories whose subcontracting
behavior was established on an order-to-order basis and not as a decision that determined all
their orders, so individual order characteristics should have a more important effect on the
decision to subcontract than for factories whose behavior is fixed and constant over time.
As shown in the left panel of Table 1.6, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable
is positive and highly significant, ranging from 0.295 to 0.299, robust to the inclusion of
category, buyer and month dummies. The interpretation of this coefficient is that, when
a factory subcontracts an order without authorization, the next order this factory delivers
is about 30 percent points more likely to be subcontracted too than if the previous order
had not been subcontracted (all else equal). The USCi,j−1 coefficient is slightly larger if we
only use the 72 type B factories, ranging from 0.296 to 0.302, and is still highly significant
(p < 0.001). Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 1 as unauthorized subcontracting in
our dataset exhibits a high and significant level of state dependence. The magnitude of this
effect must be underscored. To see this, consider that the overall prevalence or baseline of
unauthorized subcontracting is 36%. Then, the state dependence effect almost doubles the
chance of unauthorized subcontracting with respect to the baseline. In §1.5.3 we show that
this effect increases when the factory utilization is higher.
The second largest coefficient in magnitude is that of the price pressure. It ranges from
−0.167 to −0.156 for the full sample and it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This
results supports Hypothesis 2 and it means that, when a buyer offers a unit price for an
order that is lower than the factory’s usual price for that product category, the probability
of unauthorized subcontracting increases. For instance, if the price pressure of an order
is such that the unit price is 25% lower than the usual price, the chance of unauthorized
subcontracting would increase by (at least) (−15.6)×(−25%) = 3.9 percentage points. When
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we consider only type B factories in the regression, the coefficients of the price pressure
variable are larger in magnitude and range from -0.188 to -0.176.
The coefficients for the binary variable BuyerIsMajorBrandij range from -0.0371 to
-0.0353 (p < 0.05) for the full sample. Hence, an order for a major brand is about 3.7
percentage points less likely to be subcontracted without authorization, which in terms of
magnitude is almost the same effect than paying a 25% price premium with respect to the
average price. Since the overall subcontracting baseline is 36%, we find that orders from
major brands in the full sample are 10% less likely to be subcontracted. The significance
of this result is lost in the regression with only type B factories. Therefore, we only have
partial support for Hypotheses 4, but this could be due to low percentage of orders from
major brands in the dataset: only 2.2% in the full sample and 1.9% in the subsample, as
shown in Table 1.5. We further explore the role of the buyer by considering a supplier-buyer
panel structure in Section 1.5.5.
Finally, the coefficient estimates for the variable PropThisCategij were statistically in-
significant in all cases. Hence, we find no empirical evidence to support Hypotheses 3 at the
order level. However, in Appendix A.1.3 we show that the variable PropThisCategij is highly
significant when it is considered jointly with the other order-level variables RelPriceFCij
and BuyerIsMajorBrandij. Moreover, in §1.5.6 we find evidence that factories that were
less specialized did subcontract a larger proportion of their orders.
1.5.3 Relationship Between State Dependence and Factory Utilization.
The results in the previous section show that the main driver of unauthorized subcontracting
in our dataset is state dependence. The state of a factory is multidimensional but clearly a key
component is the utilization or workload (Vairaktarakis 2013). Our goal in this section is to
relate our state dependence result to the factory utilization. One challenge is that the factory
production schedule is not part of our dataset. Therefore, including the utilization directly
in our regression model would create an endogeneity problem because any proxy variable for
factory utilization is likely to have measurement error. To overcome this challenge, we repeat
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Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USCi,j−1 0.297∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0243) (0.0242)
RelPriceFC -0.156∗∗ -0.161∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.167∗∗
(0.0605) (0.0594) (0.0596) (0.0616)
PropThisCategory 0.0293 0.00307 0.00514 0.00102
(0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0343)
BuyerIsMajorBrand -0.0355∗∗ -0.0353∗ -0.0371∗
(0.0120) (0.0147) (0.0152)
LogOrderSize -0.00356 -0.00365 -0.00374 -0.00391
(0.00256) (0.00260) (0.00250) (0.00269)
Category dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies No No Yes Yes
Buyer dummies No No No Yes
N 32028 32028 32028 32028
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USCi,j−1 0.299∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0232) (0.0228)
RelPriceFC -0.176∗∗ -0.183∗∗ -0.185∗∗ -0.188∗∗
(0.0617) (0.0593) (0.0591) (0.0626)
PropThisCategory 0.0676 0.0189 0.0178 -0.0116
(0.0566) (0.0580) (0.0575) (0.0570)
BuyerIsMajorBrand -0.0612+ -0.0594 -0.0661
(0.0317) (0.0396) (0.0402)
LogOrderSize -0.00506 -0.00534 -0.00480 -0.00531
(0.00387) (0.00394) (0.00359) (0.00388)
Category dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies No No Yes Yes
Buyer dummies No No No Yes
N 18646 18646 18646 18646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.6: Coefficients of the Arellano-Bond regression, using all the data (left) and the
subsample of type B factories (right).
the regression in the previous section for different subsets of the data when the utilization
varied and then observe the changes in the coefficient for the lagged subcontracting variable
USCi,j−1.
We split the eight months of data in four two-month subperiods and we compute the
utilization of each factory in the following way. For each two-month subperiod, we take
the ratio of units delivered to factory capacity during that subperiod. The factory capacity
in our data is reported in units per month, so in a two-month subperiod factory i can
deliver 2Capacityi. Let J
i
m be the set of orders delivered by factory i during month m.
Hence, the utilization of factory i during the two-month subperiod [m,m + 1] is given by
Utilizationmi =
∑
j∈Jim∪Jim+1 OrderSizeij
2Capacityi
. Note that this workload metric is a lower bound
of the factory’s true workload. Indeed, factories may be producing for buyers that do not
place their orders through the middleman M., in which case their true workload would be
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higher than the one computed here.
Figure 1.2 shows a box plot of the two-month utilization for the four subperiods. The
figure suggests that the workload was higher in subperiods 2 and 4 (Dec 13-Jan 14 and
Apr 14-May 14) than in subperiods 1 and 3 (Oct 13-Nov 13 and Feb 14-Mar 14). Indeed,
the average workload in the former was 52% and 49% whereas in the latter it was 35%
and 31%, respectively. The overall average was 43%. Therefore, subperiods 2 and 4 had
above-average utilization and subperiods 1 and 3 had below average. Note from Figure 1.2
that several factories had a utilization above 100%, especially in subperiods 2 and 4. Quite
often factories exceed their nominal capacity, which usually leads to overtime (Vaughan-
Whitehead and Pinedo Caro 2017), but the fact that this is more prevalent in subperiods 2
and 4 confirms that these are the busier subperiods in our data.
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Figure 1.2: Box plot of the two-period utilization (Utilizationmi ) per subperiod.
Table 1.7 shows the results of the Arellano-Bond regression for each subperiod. We
focus on the results for the full sample (left panel). The results for the type B subsample
(right panel) are similar. From Table 1.7 we observe that the magnitude of the coefficient
of the lagged variable USCi,j−1 is larger and more significant when the (average) factory
utilization is higher. The coefficient for subperiod 1 is 0.164, significant at the 0.01 level, and
for subperiod 3 the coefficient is statistically insignificant. However, for the two subperiods
with above-average utilization, this coefficient is 0.257 and 0.326, respectively, and significant
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at the 0.001 level. In other words, a subcontracted order is more likely to be followed by
another subcontracted order when the workload is higher with respect to factory capacity.
One plausible interpretation of this result is that when the factory is busier, it might enter a
“subcontracting streak” in which several (consecutive) orders are diverted to unauthorized
facilities. In contrast, in periods of low utilization the queue of orders is manageable so
unauthorized subcontracting, if it happens, is more of an isolated event and is less likely
to be followed by another case of subcontracting. In line with this result, in §1.5.6 we
see that factories with a higher mean utilization showed a higher degree of unauthorized
subcontracting. To recap, we find stronger support for Hypothesis 1 in subperiods when the
factory utilization is higher.
1.5.4 Alternative Price Pressure Measures.
In this section use four alternative measures of price pressure to check the robustness of our
result regarding Hypothesis 2. The first one is RelPriceFCBij, which is computed similarly
to RelPriceFCij described in §1.4.2 but taking into account the different buyers for which
a factory produces. Let cb(j) be the category-buyer pair of order j and let P
cb(j)
i be the
one-year price moving average at factory i of orders from the same product category and
buyer than order j. Then, we define RelPriceFCBij =
Priceij − P cb(j)i
P
cb(j)
i
.
The second alternative measure of price pressure is RelPriceOrdij. This variable com-
pares an order’s unit price with the expected price of orders of similar characteristics based
on size, lead time, and product category. To compute this variable, for every delivery date
t, we take all the orders delivered during the previous year (by any factory) and regress the
unit price on the order size (in logarithmic scale), scheduled lead time, and product cate-
gory dummies. With this regression, we compute the predicted price for all orders delivered
on day t. Notice that this prediction is agnostic to factory differences because it does not
include any factory dummy. Then, order j delivered on t(j) will have predicted unit price
P
Ord,t(j)
j , where the superscript Ord refers to “order characteristics”. Note that P
Ord,t(j)
j is
essentially the prediction of a hedonic pricing model that captures volume discounts, price
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Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subperiod Oct 13– Dec 13– Feb 14– Apr 14–
Nov 13 Jan 14 Mar 14 May 14
Mean utilization 35% 52% 31% 49%
USCi,j−1 0.164∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ -0.00307 0.326∗∗∗
(0.0600) (0.0237) (0.157) (0.0659)
RelPriceFC -0.0528 -0.119∗ -0.00961 -0.0750+
(0.0527) (0.0483) (0.0503) (0.0452)
PropThisCategory 0.127+ 0.0334 -0.00451 -0.0768
(0.0718) (0.0373) (0.0630) (0.112)
LogOrderSize -0.00173 -0.00427 -0.000333 -0.00223
(0.00170) (0.00282) (0.00363) (0.00307)
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9752 13712 2718 5846
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subperiod Oct 13– Dec 13– Feb 14– Apr 14–
Nov 13 Jan 14 Mar 14 May 14
Mean utilization 44% 66% 31% 64%
USCi,j−1 0.252∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.0638 0.315∗∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0384) (0.0991) (0.0638)
RelPriceFC -0.0929 -0.133∗∗ -0.0147 -0.0832+
(0.0858) (0.0485) (0.0703) (0.0466)
PropThisCategory 0.367∗ 0.0617 -0.0682 -0.136
(0.150) (0.0704) (0.137) (0.159)
LogOrderSize -0.00120 -0.00593+ -0.00119 -0.00307
(0.00300) (0.00303) (0.00667) (0.00381)
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4792 7704 1642 4508
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.7: Arellano-Bond (all-dummies model) using different subsets of data: (1) months 1
and 2, in which the average factory utilization is low; (2) months 3 and 4, in which the average
factory utilization is high; (3) months 5 and 6, in which the average factory utilization is
low; (4) months 7 and 8, in which the average factory utilization is high. Left panel has all
factories. Right panel is for type B factories.
premiums for rush orders, and the buyers’ willingness to pay across categories. We use
this predicted price as a reference point for the price pressure variable. Namely, we have
RelPriceOrdij =
Priceij − P Ord,t(j)j
P
Ord,t(j)
j
.
Next, the variable RelPriceOrdFij is defined in the same way as RelPriceOrdij, but in-
cluding factory dummies in the regression model. Therefore, P
OrdF,t(j)
ij does take into account
differences between factories, apart from differences between orders, and RelPriceOrdFij =
Priceij − P OrdF,t(j)ij
P
OrdF,t(j)
ij
.
Finally, it is natural to associate price with quality. Our conversations with the mid-
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dleman M. indicate that the quality within each factory in our dataset tends to be quite
uniform, but we do not have information about the quality characteristics of the orders
placed at each factory, so we are not able to validate this claim empirically. We try to ad-
dress this issue by considering the variable RelPriceFSubij that is computed in the same
way as RelPriceFCij, but dividing each category into two subcategories depending on price.
Specifically, for each factory i and order j, if Priceij ≥ P c(j)i , we classify order j into the
subcategory “orders of c(j) with high price”; otherwise, its subcategory is “orders of c(j)
with low price”. The underlying assumption in this classification is that price correlates
with quality, so products with a price above (below) average are more likely to be high (low)
quality. Let s(j) be the subcategory of order j and let P
s(j)
i be the one-year moving average
of price in that subcategory. Then, we measure price pressure within order j’s subcategory,
i.e., RelPriceFSubij =
Priceij − P s(j)i
P
s(j)
i
.
The coefficient estimates of the full-dummies Arellano-Bond regression using different
measures of price pressure is shown in Table 1.8. The first column uses RelPriceFCij, and
is therefore the same as column (4) in Table 1.6. Columns (2)-(5) use the alternative measures
described in this section. The variable RelPriceFCBij is significant and has a coefficient
in same order of magnitude than RelPriceFCij. The two price pressure measures that
are based on order characteristics, RelPriceOrdij and RelPriceOrdFij, are only significant
in the regression using the type B subsample, which is consistent with the fact that type
B factories are those that subcontract without authorization on an order-by-order basis.
Finally, when we consider subcategories, the variable RelPriceFSubij is highly significant
in both samples, which provides further support for Hypothesis 2. It should be noted that,
for the subsample with type B factories, all the coefficients of the different price pressure
measures are remarkably in the same range.
1.5.5 Supplier-Buyer Panel Structure.
The panel structure in Table 1.6 is at the factory level and it includes an (unobservable)
fixed effect for each factory. The latter is a valid model if a factory’s baseline or intrinsic
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level of unauthorized subcontracting is the same regardless of the buyer placing the order.
However, it is possible that the factories behave strategically depending on the buyer they
are dealing with. For instance, if the order is placed by a preferred buyer, the factory might
be less willing to engage in unauthorized subcontracting. We cannot observe the details of
the buyer-supplier relationship, but we can redefine the panel structure of our data so every
cross-section unit corresponds to a unique supplier-buyer pair. This panel structure allows
us to include a fixed effect for each supplier-buyer pair.
Given that most suppliers worked with a small number of buyers (1.4 on average, see Table
1.2), there are 321 supplier-buyer pairs. Then, for every supplier-buyer pair, we compute
variables equivalent to those described in §1.4 and repeat the Arellano-Bond regression now
shown in Table 1.9. Note that in this case the model cannot include BuyerIsMajorBrandij
or buyer dummies, as they would be collinear with the fixed effects. The results with
the supplier-buyer panel structure are consistent with those shown in Section 1.5.2. In
particular, the coefficients and the significance of the state dependence (USCi,j−1) and price
pressure (RelPriceFCij) variables are very much the same, which provides further support
for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
1.5.6 Unauthorized Subcontracting and Factory Characteristics.
Figure 1.1 shows that factories exhibit different propensity to engage in unauthorized sub-
contracting. Do any factory characteristics correlate with such differentiated behavior? To
shed some light, we regress each factory’s proportion of subcontracted orders on factory
characteristics. Specifically, the dependent variable is USCi =
∑ni
j=1 USCij/ni, where ni is
the number of orders processed at factory i in our dataset. The names of the regressors are
self-explanatory and are given in Table 1.10. We use two different models: a linear regres-
sion, estimated with OLS, and a Tobit regression, since the dependent variable is bounded
between 0 and 1, with a large number of observations being zero. The Tobit regression
represents factories’ latent willingness to subcontract, as opposed to their observed level of
subcontracting.
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Table 1.10 shows that the most significant variable is the mean utilization, computed
as the average of the utilization during the period in which each factory was active. Its
coefficient estimates are 0.105 (in the linear model) and 0.191 (Tobit). This means that a
factory would have subcontracted 5.3% more of its production if it had been 50% busier,
all else equal. This observation strengthens our analysis on the relationship between factory
utilization and unauthorized subcontracting (Section 1.5.3), measured through state depen-
dence. The number of categories that each factory produced over the data collection period
is also significant at the 0.05 level. For each additional category that a factory produced, its
aggregate degree of unauthorized subcontracting increased by 3.04 percent points, i.e., less
specialized factories subcontracted more. Factory capacity is weakly significant (p < 0.1) in
the linear model and insignificant in the Tobit regression. A factory’s proportion of orders
that came from a major brand is weakly significant in the Tobit model: producing for a ma-
jor brand decreases factories’ willingness to subcontract, but this result does not carry over
to the linear model, again possibly due to the low number of orders from major brands. The
number of different buyers a factory produced for does not show a significant effect on its
subcontracting practices. Factories located in China subcontracted more than in any other
country and factories in Bangladesh exhibited a lower willingness to subcontract (p < 0.05).
This last result should be taken with some distance since the data was collected after the
Rana Plaza collapse when a large number of NGOs, media outlets, governments, etc., were
monitoring Bangladesh closely.
Finally, notice that the R2 for the linear model is 0.1965, and the pseudo-R2 for the
Tobit model is 0.1375. In other words, observable characteristics of factories explain a small
amount of the variability in their subcontracting behavior. We infer that suppliers choose a
baseline subcontracting level as a strategic decision, which is unobservable to us.
1.6. Prediction
In Section 1.5 we analyzed the factors driving unauthorized subcontracting. We now aim
to predict which orders have a high probability of being subcontracted. In other words,
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would retailers be able to know that a certain order is likely to be subcontracted so to make
better sourcing decisions? Predicting binary events is a vastly researched topic in finance,
for instance to predict bankruptcy or financial distress (Sarkar and Sriram 2001, Alan and
Lapre´ 2018), but now it is also becoming more common in other areas, including supply chain
management. In fact, predicting unauthorized subcontracting was the original motivation
of the middleman M. that sparked this research project. Our goal here is to show how well
the middleman or a retailer could do with simple linear models based on the findings from
Section 1.5. We acknowledge that more sophisticated models are likely to perform even
better, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. We rather want to provide a competitive
benchmark that is a good starting point.
To study how much future unauthorized subcontracting can be predicted, we divide our
data in two subsets, training and test. The training data is used to estimate the coefficients
of a linear regression model, whilst the test data is used to make out-of-sample predictions
and quantify how accurate they are. To divide the observations between training and test
we sort them by order delivery date and then split it; the reason for not randomizing them
before partitioning is that the goal of this analysis is using knowledge of the past to predict
the future, so we need to keep the chronological order. To check the robustness of our
prediction, we repeat this procedure several times using different proportions of data in each
subset (from 20% training and 80% test, to 80% and 20%).
Once the data is divided, we fit three different linear models with the training data
set. First, a model containing the following variables: Utilizationij (factory i’s utilization
during the one-month period before delivering order j), RelPriceFCij, PropThisCategoryij,
BuyerIsMajorBrandij, LogOrderSizeij, and a whole set of product category dummies. We
call these order-level variables, since they vary order to order. Note that this model does
not take into account any information about the factory’s willingness to subcontract or not,
but does contain, implicitly, information on the factory’s reference prices, specialization, and
amount of workload in the recent past. The second linear model we fit contains the previous
variables, plus a set of factory dummies, which measure each factory’s idiosyncratic baseline
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degree of unauthorized subcontracting during the training data set months, representing its
managerial decision on whether or not to subcontract, and how much. Finally, we fit a linear
model containing the order-level variables and the lagged variable USCi,j−1 to capture the
unauthorized subcontracting status of the previous order delivered by the factory.
After fitting the linear models, we compute the predicted probabilities of unauthorized
subcontracting for the orders in the test dataset and apply the following classification rule:
if the predicted probability of unauthorized subcontracting of a given order is greater than
a threshold δ, we predict it will, indeed, be subcontracted; if it is δ or smaller, we predict it
will not. Figure 1.3 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for each model,
and Table 1.11 shows the area under each ROC curve, obtained by varying the threshold δ
between 0 and 1. If we set the classification threshold to δ = 0.5, which is arguably the most
parsimonious choice, we obtain the accuracies shown in Table 1.12, and the Type I and II
errors shown in Table 1.13.
Tables 1.11-1.13 show the importance of considering an idiosyncratic baseline. Indeed,
including a factory fixed effect improves all metrics significantly; in particular, the accuracy
of the prediction is greater than 0.82. Hence, the middleman can correctly predict whether
or not unauthorized subcontracting will occur for more than 82% of the orders, and can do so
using information at his disposal. Note that this accuracy level is a substantial improvement
upon naive predictions. For instance, predicting that all orders will not be subcontracted
has an accuracy of 64%. Such prediction is very extreme because the Type II error is 100%.
A slightly more clever approach is to predict that subcontracting will occur for orders in
factories type C (see Figure 1.1), will not occur for orders in factories type A, and then
randomize with a 50% chance for orders in factories type B (the prevalence of unauthorized
subcontracting in factories type B is roughly 50%, see Table 1.5). This approach has an
accuracy of 72%, which is still quite below the accuracy of the linear model with order-level
variables and fixed effects.
If it were possible to observe the factory’s decision for every order it produced, then by
adding a lagged dependent variable it would be possible to predict unauthorized subcon-
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Figure 1.3: ROC curve of the linear prediction for our three different models (order variables,
order variables + factory FE, order variables + lagged USC), using 20% of the data for
training and 80% for test (upper left), 40%-60% (upper right), 60%-40% (bottom left), and
80%-20% (bottom right).
tracting with more than 92% accuracy. However, knowing every factory decision might not
be realistic. Using only order-level variables, without fixed effects, leads to a lower accuracy
due to the number of false negatives: of all the orders that were subcontracted, the model is
able to predict only 20-30% of them (see Table 1.13). In other words, the model that does
not include any factory information is quite conservative. Nevertheless, it could be useful
when there is no past information available about a factory’s subcontracting behavior.
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One caveat of the linear prediction models presented here is that they are highly affected
by seasonality patterns in unauthorized subcontracting that are driven by the peaks of
workload in different times of the year. This makes the accuracy of the prediction actually
decrease when the size of the training data set increases. Unfortunately, we only have
eight months of data, which means that we cannot include any seasonality variable in our
prediction. However, this issue would be solved if more data became available. An additional
cause for the decrease in accuracy when the training dataset is larger is overfitting: the
accuracy ratio between training and test is increasing in the size of the training data set.
This is also true for the AUC ratio and for the sum of squared errors. A full implementation
would have to take care of these details but the starting point provided here is already quite
promising.
1.7. Discussion and Managerial Insights
Unauthorized subcontracting in the apparel industry is a problem that needs to be addressed:
most of last years’ industrial catastrophes and disclosed severe violations of labor standards
occurred in second tier suppliers that retailers had not authorized. In this paper, we have
also shown that this problem can indeed be addressed, as it is highly predictable, and related
to some operational variables that buyers can act on.
We proposed two research questions. As the main drivers of unauthorized subcontract-
ing, we first observe a great amount of autocorrelation between orders of the same factory.
An order is 83% more likely to be subcontracted without authorization if the previous order
by the same factory was also subcontracted than if it was not. This state-dependent sub-
contracting behavior is highly related to workload: its effect is larger when factories enter
periods of high utilization. After state dependence, price pressure is the next main driver of
unauthorized subcontracting: an order with a unit price 10% lower than the factory’s aver-
age for that product category, which happens for one in every three orders in our data, is 4%
more likely to be subcontracted, and an order with a price pressure of 25%, which happens
12% of the times, is 11% more likely to be subcontracted without the buyer’s authorization.
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Orders produced for a buyer which is a major brand are 10% less likely to be subcontracted,
but this effect vanishes is some of the subsamples possibility because there are too few orders
from major brands. We find no individual effect of factory specialization, but we do find a
joint effect with other order characteristics, and we also find an effect at the factory level:
less specialized factories subcontracted a larger proportion of their orders. In particular, for
every extra product category that they produced, their average unauthorized subcontracting
level increased by 14%.
At the supplier level, apart from its level of specialization, we find an effect of the sup-
plier’s location, with China being the country where unauthorized subcontracting occurs
more often. We do not find any effect of the number of buyers or the size of the factory.
Nevertheless, the factory-level regression only explains 20% of factories’ differentiated sub-
contracting behavior, suggesting that suppliers choose to specialize in an amount of unautho-
rized subcontracting and this is a managerial decision that is not observable to us. However,
as we have seen, we can use the observed supplier’s past of unauthorized subcontracting as
a proxy to measure this managerial decision. From an academic standpoint, our findings
at the factory level provide empirical support to common assumptions used in theoretical
models, e.g., Orsdemir et al. (2015) and Chen and Lee (2016).
The results in this paper show that buyers should study suppliers’ past subcontracting
behavior before starting to work with them but, in addition, they should minimize the
probability of each individual order being subcontracted by not exerting price pressure and
by monitoring suppliers’ workload closely to avoid overutilization. Knowing that factories
suffer from poor production planning (Hurst et al. 2005), buyers should collaborate with their
suppliers and offer training and consulting to help them organize their production efficiently,
as well as develop the technical capabilities that each product type requires (Kraft et al.
2017). On a larger scale, similar to Caro et al. (2016), there is an opportunity for buyer
consortiums that jointly monitor their suppliers to avoid overutilization. In the case of
intermediaries, they can also work closely with brands to help them plan their orders taking
into account the workload upstream in the supply chain. This approach seems more plausible
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for basic apparel. For fashion products, buyers can try to emulate the strategy followed by
the Spanish retailer Zara, which consists in operating reasonably below capacity on average
to ensure rapid response times (Caro 2012).
For our second research question, we have proposed a simple prediction method to detect
which orders will be subcontracted. The data is split between a training set, that is used to
estimate the model’s parameters, and a test set. By knowing the fraction of orders that the
factory subcontracted during the training period, plus each order’s specific characteristics,
we can predict unauthorized subcontracting with more than 82% accuracy. Therefore, for at
least 4 out of 5 orders, unauthorized subcontracting could have been predicted correctly and
better sourcing decisions could have been made to prevent it. If subcontracting information
for the most recent order is available, then one can predict unauthorized subcontracting
correctly in more than 90% of the cases.
The data used in this work consists of variables that buyers (retailers or intermediaries)
have already at their disposal. Hence, our findings could be implemented in a decision
support system (DSS) to help buyers prevent unauthorized subcontracting among their sup-
pliers. Such system could be used to monitor each factory’s workload and queue of pending
orders, in addition to tracking the product categories that the factory can produce together
with the average price per category. Then, the system could detect and flag orders with a
high chance of being subcontracted before they are placed to a given factory. The DSS could
also suggest alternative factories that would be more suitable for that order or could require
the user to justify their choice. There is ample literature on how to design systems to nudge
users in a desirable direction (Meeker et al. 2016). We must note that our methods rely
on time-varying variables. Hence, the DSS would have to update the data and estimations
on a rolling horizon basis, which could pose some challenges if the recommendations of the
DSS induces suppliers to hide information, similar to the backfiring situation described in
Plambeck and Taylor (2016).
In addition to detecting risky orders and helping their current suppliers improve their
efficiency, buyers should streamline the compliance certification process, as well as the autho-
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rization process to subcontract an order or a part of it. Subcontracting is a regular practice
in the industry and it only poses a problem when the buyer loses visibility and an order
ends up in a non-compliant factory. It is quite possible that some of the subcontractors have
reasonable working conditions but lack a formal compliance qualification because the certifi-
cation process is too cumbersome. Similarly, if getting the buyers’s approval to subcontract
an order is a lengthy process, then factories might skip it, even when the subcontractor is
compliant. Regardless, the buyer might want to learn more about the network of informal
factories to find ways to add as many as possible to the list of approved suppliers.
Our work provides opportunities for further research. On the empirical side, it would
be important to see other studies that complement ours. For instance, our study is limited
to the orders handled by the middleman M. Hence, we do not observe any other orders
produced by the factories. Similarly, we are not aware of the sourcing portfolio of the
different buyers. With more factory and buyer information and a proper costing model one
could look at margins and its interactions, and study how they might relate to unauthorized
subcontracting. Moreover, there are many open questions on subcontracting that our study
is not able to answer, e.g., do ISO standards or other codes of conduct make a difference?
Or, does the presence of competing factories in the same area make subcontracting more/less
likely? There is also room for improvement in the prediction of subcontracting given the wide
range of deep learning techniques that are becoming available. Note as well that our model
predicts subcontracting when ideally one would want to predict noncompliance, or even
better, the chance of a disaster. On the theoretical side, a crucial issue is finding mechanisms
to ensure truthful disclosure of subcontracting without compromising the option of weeding
out the factories that specialize in subcontracting a high percentage of their orders. Another
interesting problem is how to assign orders to suppliers with the objective of minimizing cost
or time subject to a chance constraint on subcontracting. Finally, more research is needed on
how to engage brands and consumers in solving the unauthorized subcontracting problem.
Acknowledgments. First and foremost we thank the middleman M. for providing the data and
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Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
USCi,j−1 0.295∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0258) (0.0250)
PropThisCategory 0.00102 -0.00398 0.00970 0.00814 0.00233
(0.0343) (0.0330) (0.0354) (0.0339) (0.0336)
LogOrderSize -0.00391 -0.00401 -0.00160 -0.00180+ -0.00274+
(0.00269) (0.00278) (0.000981) (0.000933) (0.00146)
RelPriceFC -0.167∗∗
(0.0616)
RelPriceFCB -0.163∗∗
(0.0597)
RelPriceOrd -0.0809
(0.0563)
RelPriceOrdF -0.0320
(0.0332)
RelPriceFSub -0.133∗∗∗
(0.0306)
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 32028 32028 32028 32028 32028
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
USCi,j−1 0.298∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0220) (0.0226) (0.0267)
PropThisCategory -0.0116 -0.0257 0.0134 -0.0136 -0.00688
(0.0570) (0.0561) (0.0613) (0.0568) (0.0572)
LogOrderSize -0.00531 -0.00538 -0.00198 -0.00411 -0.00361+
(0.00388) (0.00395) (0.00268) (0.00319) (0.00208)
RelPriceFC -0.188∗∗
(0.0626)
RelPriceFCB -0.181∗∗
(0.0596)
RelPriceOrd -0.190∗∗∗
(0.0573)
RelPriceOrdF -0.171∗
(0.0695)
RelPriceFSub -0.135∗∗∗
(0.0337)
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18646 18646 18646 18646 18646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.8: Arellano-Bond regression using the full data set (left) and the subsample of type
B factories (right), with five different measures of price pressure: (1) with respect to the
moving average per factory and category; (2) with respect to the moving average per factory,
category, and buyer; (3) with respect to the predicted price using order size, lead time, and
category; (4) with respect to the predicted price using order size, lead time, category, and
factory; and (5) with respect to the moving average per factory and subcategory.
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Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3)
USCi,j−1 0.297∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0243)
RelPriceFC -0.158∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.165∗∗
(0.0607) (0.0596) (0.0598)
PropThisCategory 0.0311 0.00524 0.00737
(0.0346) (0.0343) (0.0343)
LogOrderSize -0.00371 -0.00380 -0.00390
(0.00265) (0.00268) (0.00258)
Category dummies No Yes Yes
Month dummies No No Yes
N 32028 32028 32028
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Unauthorized subcontracting
Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3)
USCi,j−1 0.300∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0231)
RelPriceFC -0.178∗∗ -0.185∗∗ -0.187∗∗
(0.0620) (0.0591) (0.0591)
PropThisCategory 0.0905+ 0.0359 0.0365
(0.0534) (0.0549) (0.0544)
LogOrderSize -0.00550 -0.00575 -0.00527
(0.00403) (0.00401) (0.00369)
Category dummies No Yes Yes
Month dummies No No Yes
N 18646 18646 18646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.9: Arellano-Bond regression using the full dataset (left) and the subsample of type-B
factories (right) for a panel structure at the supplier-buyer level. The regression includes
fixed effects for each supplier-buyer pair.
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Proportion of subcontracted orders
Linear Tobit
(1) (2)
NumCategories 0.0304∗ (0.0139) 0.0615∗ (0.0297)
NumBuyers -0.0138 (0.0211) 0.0678 (0.0664)
PropMajorBrand -0.135 (0.113) -2.116∗ (0.837)
MeanUtilization 0.105∗ (0.0426) 0.191∗ (0.0934)
LogCapacity 0.0451+ (0.0261) 0.0999 (0.0737)
Bangladesh -0.118 (0.0845) -1.058∗ (0.485)
Cambodia 0.0346 (0.132) -0.0486 (0.459)
China 0.225∗ (0.0874) 0.610∗ (0.299)
Indonesia -0.132 (0.0963) -0.727+ (0.436)
Vietnam 0.0102 (0.111) 0.126 (0.367)
R2 0.1965
Pseudo R2 0.1375
N 226 226
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.10: Linear and Tobit regression of factories’ proportion of subcontracted orders on
factory characteristics. The overall factory-level baseline is
∑
i USCi/226 = 0.28.
Training-test 20%-80% 40%-60% 60%-40% 80%-20%
Order variables 0.7195 0.6680 0.6238 0.6155
Order + factory FE 0.9099 0.9092 0.9059 0.8865
Order + lagged USC 0.9444 0.9349 0.9279 0.9302
Table 1.11: Area under the ROC curve of the linear prediction for our three different models.
Training-test 20%-80% 40%-60% 60%-40% 80%-20%
Order variables 0.6699 0.6476 0.5876 0.5554
Order + factory FE 0.8551 0.8480 0.8468 0.8247
Order + lagged USC 0.9360 0.9267 0.9210 0.9206
Table 1.12: Accuracy of the linear prediction for our three different models.
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Training-test 20%-80% 40%-60% 60%-40% 80%-20%
Order variables Type I 0.0561 0.1458 0.1815 0.1809
Type II 0.7847 0.6708 0.7181 0.6906
Order + factory FE Type I 0.1012 0.1222 0.1512 0.2743
Type II 0.2175 0.1981 0.1558 0.0830
Order + lagged USC Type I 0.0516 0.0609 0.0680 0.0817
Type II 0.0846 0.0924 0.0936 0.0774
Table 1.13: Type I and II errors of the linear prediction for our three different models.
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CHAPTER 2
Believing in Analytics: Managers’ Adherence to Price
Recommendations from a DSS
2.1. Introduction
“When it comes to implementation, the success of operations management tools and techniques,
and the accuracy of its theories, relies heavily on our understanding of human behavior”(Bendoly
et al. 2006)
A large portion of the Operations Management literature provides prescriptive solutions
to practitioners’ complex problems. In some cases, these solutions get successfully imple-
mented, leading to higher revenue, lower costs, increased efficiency of the system, or other
improvements.
Sometimes firms implement these solutions in the form of automated algorithms. How-
ever, leaving algorithms to make decisions unsupervised can be risky. For instance, algo-
rithms that set prices automatically by tracking competitors have led to notorious failures,
such as a $23 million biology textbook (Eisen Eisen), or thousands of products priced at
£0.01, a mistake that brought losses of up to £100,000 to many small vendors (Neate 2014).
Other times, operational solutions are implemented in the form of a decision support
systems (DSS), which is a tool that makes algorithm-based recommendations to human
decision makers, who can implement the DSS’ recommendations or deviate from them. The
usage of DSSs can greatly improve the decisions being made (Sharda et al. 1988, Hoch and
Schkade 1996), since humans are prone to a large number of cognitive biases (Kahneman
2003a,b, Hastie and Dawes 2010). Even highly trained managers can be biased and make
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suboptimal decisions (Bazerman and Moore 2008, Schweitzer and Cachon 2000).
When managers make operational decisions assisted by a DSS, their choices impact the
performance of the firm. If the DSS’s algorithm is recommending optimal decisions but
managers deviate from them, the potential improvement that the DSS was supposed to
cause may never be realized. Therefore, it is important to study how humans interact with
these tools and what drives their adherence to its recommendations. Understanding the
behavioral aspects of managers’ usage of DSSs can provide insights on how to design their
interfaces to ensure a successful implementation.
In this paper, we study the aftermath of the implementation of a DSS for clearance sales
markdown optimization at Zara. A pilot test of a prototype in 2008 showed that the DSS
increased revenue by almost 6%; see Caro and Gallien (2012). However, after the DSS was
rolled out in 2010, managers’ average adherence to its recommendations was only 46% for
franchise stores and 61% for stores owned by Zara. In the three years that followed, the
managers gained experience, but more importantly, Zara performed two key interventions
to the DSS, which we study in detail in Section 2.4. Figure 2.1 illustrates the starting and
ending points of this study. The horizontal axis is the adherence of each country manager
and the vertical axis is the financial performance summarized by the metric Y , which is
the ratio between clearance sales revenue and the initial inventory valued at regular season
prices. As shown in the figure, after the interventions took place, the average adherence
was higher and less disperse, and the behavior of franchises and own stores was very much
aligned. The higher adherence translated into higher revenues as measured by the metric Y ,
therefore confirming what had been observed in the 2008 pilot.
The two interventions performed by Zara consisted in changes to the DSS’s interface used
by the country managers. The first intervention was showing the revenue metric Y that the
algorithm was maximizing. The rationale was to provide timely feedback to the managers’
pricing decisions. The second intervention consisted in showing a reference point for the Y
revenue metric, so that it would be easier to interpret. We run a difference-in-differences
analysis to study the effect that these interventions had on managers’ adherence. We find
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between adherence to the DSS’s recommendations and revenue in
fall-winter 2010, before the interventions (left) and fall-winter 2013, after the interventions
(right). The green dots correspond to managers from countries in which Zara owns the stores.
The pink triangles correspond to managers from franchise countries. The exact values of the
revenue metric Y have been disguised.
that Intervention 1 had no significant effect on managers’ adherence, but once combined with
Intervention 2, the adherence increased by 9 percentage points. Overall, franchise managers’
adherence increased by 25% when the second intervention took place, and their likelihood of
deviating, i.e., marking down a product when the DSS recommended staying put, decreased
by 48%.
In addition to the difference-in-difference analysis on the effect of the interventions, we
perform a Heckman regression to further understand the drivers of managers’ decision to
deviate and the magnitude of their deviations. We find that managers were 45% more likely
to adhere to a price recommendation if it was consistent with their pre-DSS rule of thumb
(which was based on inventory minimization, not revenue maximization), but after the in-
terventions this effect decreased to 17%. There was an even stronger relationship between
adherence and their previous heuristic when it was computed using group-aggregate inven-
tory metrics, as opposed to individual product’s. For countries in which unsold inventory
could be salvaged, a 10% increase in a product’s salvage value was related to a 6% higher
probability of implementing the price the DSS recommends, and this effect increased to 9%
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after the interventions. Managers were more likely to deviate from the DSS’s recommenda-
tions when the number of prices to set was high, as a company-specific pricing rule allowed
them to reduce this quantity.
The speed at which a product was being sold affected the magnitude of their price
deviations: an extra week in the predicted time until a product would be sold out was
related to a 1.9% larger price deviation, but this number was 1.4% after the interventions. In
countries in which unsold inventory could be salvaged, a 10% higher salvage value was related
to 1.45% larger price deviations, but this effect was insignificant after the interventions.
Our results are consistent with a number of cognitive biases. First, preference for the
status quo: managers expected the DSS to follow the heuristic that they used before it was
implemented. Second, salience of the inventory compared to a revenue forecast: managers
overestimated the importance of the speed of sales, and tried to sell all inventory out instead
of maximizing revenue. Third, loss aversion: managers’ inventory-minimizing behavior was
less prominent when products had a large salvage value. Fourth, inattention: managers
attempted to reduce the amount of prices to set every week, and often paid more attention
to group-aggregate metrics instead of those for individual products. Finally, the effect of
the interventions on adherence and the way in which they mitigated some of these cognitive
biases suggests that the interventions effectively made revenue more salient than before, and
that having a reference point for the abstract revenue metric helped managers interpret it.
Our findings provide insights on how to increase voluntary adherence that can be used
in any context in which a company wants an analytical tool to be adopted organically by its
users.
Some of the data presented in this paper has been disguised to protect its confidentiality,
and we emphasize that the views presented here do not necessarily represent those of the
Inditex Group.
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2.2. Literature Review
Some related literature suggests that deviating from a DSS’s recommendation is not always
bad: it could be a way of enriching it with additional data. For instance, Cui et al. (2015)
show that deviating from fixed inventory policies allows managers to incorporate private
information that the policy does not take into account. In a laboratory experiment, Flicker
(2018) finds that adding a noisy signal available to managers into the DSS’s algorithm
improves the outcomes of a newsvendor-type decision respect to those generated by the DSS
when no additional information is included. In Tan and Staats (2016), managers in a casual
dining restaurant deviate from the recommended routing policy by assigning more tasks to
highly-efficient workers, or to those with low workload, and these deviations improve the
restaurant’s performance when they are not too large. In our work, we study adherence
to a DSS that had been proven to improve the firm’s revenue, and so deviating from its
recommendations is detrimental to the firm’s profit.
It may happen that managers’ incentives are not aligned with the DSS’s, and this leads
them to deviate from its recommendations. In Van Donselaar et al. (2010), store managers
at a supermarket chain receive inventory replenishment recommendations from a DSS. Man-
agers were not penalized for holding costs, which were not salient to them, but they did
take into account labor costs and workload, which the DSS was ignoring. In our paper,
managers were incentivized to generate a high revenue, which was also the firm’s objective.
Furthermore, the DSS was already incorporating all the firm’s pricing rules regarding the
labor costs related to marking products down and the shelf space that was necessary during
clearance sales.
Bearden et al. (2008) tackle cognitive biases in revenue management. In their study,
decision makers in a laboratory setting do not set prices but, instead, decide whether to
accept an offer for a product of which they have a fixed number of units to sell. The
subjects’ objective is to sell all inventory out, but they consistently deviate from the policies
that would help them achieve their goal. In contrast, managers in our data were instructed
and incentivized to maximize revenue, and this was also the DSS’s objective.
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In some contexts, deviations from prescribed policies is linked to worse outcomes for both
decision makers and the firms for which they work. For instance, in Ibanez et al. (2017)
doctors who examine randomly assigned radiological images have discretion to order the
tasks in their queue. They find that doctors often deviate from the prescribed FIFO policy
in favor of batching similar tasks or of completing shorter tasks first, and that experienced
doctors deviate more. Although the quality of their work is not affected by their deviations
from the prescribed order, their productivity decreases when they decide to deviate, i.e.,
their task completion times become longer. In our setting, managers’ deviations from the
DSS also lead to worse outcomes (lower revenue). Although we do not focus on experience
and use it as a control, we also find that it is associated to lower adherence for some manager
types.
The paper most closely related to our work is Elmaghraby et al. (2015), which studies how
salespeople in a B2B setting decide prices for different grocery products assisted by a DSS.
They find that salespeople use the price recommendation as an external reference point,
but the extent to which this reference price influences their decision depends on the sign
and magnitude of the recommended price change. They find characteristics of salespeople,
customers, and products that affect how prices are set, as well as an important role of
products’ changes in cost on final changes in price. Our work differs from theirs in several
aspects. First, the managers in our data set prices for the final consumer, as opposed to
a B2B setting. Second, the products for which prices are being set are fashion products,
with a much higher demand uncertainty than groceries. Third, in our setting costs are not
an important driver of price changes during clearance sales, given that the cost of inventory
has already been paid and does not change over the campaign. Finally, their focus is on
what drives price changes, and the DSS’s recommendations play a moderating role, while
our focus is on the behavioral drivers of adherence decisions.
Our work contributes to the Behavioral Operations Management literature in multiple
ways. First, the behavioral aspects of pricing have been studied in depth when consumers
exhibit cognitive biases. However, to our knowledge, managers’ behavioral biases in pricing
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decision making have been only studied in B2B contexts (Zheng and O¨zer 2012). Second,
we not only show what the operational and behavioral drivers of adherence are, but we also
study two interventions that had a large effect on adherence and that can help us under-
stand how the DSS’s interface impacts managers’ adherence to its recommendations and,
ultimately, how to design better DSSs. Third, while many papers in the OM literature de-
scribe tools, algorithms and methods which were implemented in practice, and report on the
tool’s performance after being implemented, few track the aftermath of a tool’s implementa-
tion in terms of usage like this paper. Finally, we use data from a large fast fashion retailer
that contains the actual pricing decisions made by the firm’s managers. Using observational
data to study adherence to a DSS and cognitive biases of real managers supplements our
field’s extensive findings in laboratory settings and can inform future modeling approaches
to similar problems.
2.3. Empirical Setting
2.3.1 Clearance Sales at Zara
Spanish retailer Zara, like many other fashion retailers, sets a clearance sales period at the
end of every season (fall-winter, or W, and spring-summer, or S). This period usually lasts
around 12 weeks, set by the specific regulations of every country. Once the sales campaign
begins, the prices of products change regularly (usually weekly) and these markdowns occur
for all products in a country at the same time. The pricing decisions are the responsibility of
one person for each country, called the country manager, with the support of a small pricing
committee.
These markdowns are constrained by some company rules. To list them, we first need
to define some company-specific terminology. A group is a set of products of the same kind
targeted towards a customer type. For instance, young women’s knitwear, basic women’s
shirts, etc. There are a fixed number of groups, which are consistent over the years and
across countries, whereas the product assortment within every group changes every new
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season. Within a group, a cluster is a set of SKUs which had the same price during the
regular season. For instance, all the basic tops which were 19.95e during the regular season
form a cluster, even though they were not the exact same SKU, and all the basic tops which
were 14.95e are part of a different cluster.
One of the firm’s pricing rules is that, during the clearance sales campaign, the price of
each cluster cannot increase. Another rule is that clusters cannot be split, i.e., the 19.95e
basic tops cluster may experience several markdowns during the sales campaign, but all
products within that cluster will always be marked down by the same amount at the same
time. In addition, different clusters can converge to the same price, but never cross: the
19.95e basic tops cluster, even after several markdowns, must at least as expensive as than
the 14.95e basic tops cluster, because this was their order during the regular season. Finally,
when two clusters’ price converges, these two clusters’ prices will be coupled for the rest of
the campaign. For instance, if the 19.95e cluster was marked down to 14.95e, and the
14.95e cluster was unchanged, then both clusters would need to be marked down by the
same amount for all the remaining sales weeks. A set of products containing one or more
clusters whose prices have converged at some point is called a category. These rules are
driven by legal and practical reasons detailed in Caro and Gallien (2012).
A particular characteristic of Zara’s business model is that, in the countries where it is
present, it either owns all the stores in the country (or a large majority) or all the stores there
belong to a franchise. Some of the franchisee firms manage more than one country, while
some others do so for only one. This distinction between country types will be important in
our empirical analysis. More specifically, for own-store countries, pricing decisions were all
made in Zara’s headquarters in Spain, so the managers from those countries were arguably
subject to peer effects regarding usage of the DSS. In contrast, pricing decisions for franchise
countries were made where the franchisee company was (with the support of a country
representative located in Zara’s Spain headquarters), so the individuals who managed those
countries were separate from each other. Additionally, any garments that remain unsold at
the end of clearance sales in own-store countries can be salvaged, but franchises purchase
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the inventory and at the end of the campaign its salvage value is zero.
2.3.2 Implementation of the DSS
Until 2007, country managers made their markdown decisions based on weekly reports that
contained metrics on inventory levels and speed of sales. Two metrics that were emphasized
in those reports were the success, defined as the percentage of all the inventory for that
category that had been sold by that week, and the rotation, or the remaining time for all
the inventory of that category to be sold out at the speed of sales observed in the previous
three days. A screenshot of one of those inventory reports can be seen in the appendix.
In 2008, Zara adopted a sales pricing optimization system (Caro and Gallien 2012). This
system built a demand forecast and used it in a revenue maximization dynamic program
which found optimal prices for the remainder of the clearance sales campaign. The algorithm,
which was ran in a rolling horizon basis, included as constraints all the company’s pricing
rules, which reflected practical issues such as shelf space, labor, etc.
The company made the strategic choice to not automate the pricing process and keep
managers responsible for the final prices implemented in each country, since Zara’s operations
are people-centric. For this reason, the algorithm was embedded in a DSS to assist the
country managers with their markdown decisions. The DSS worked in the following way:
every week, in addition to the inventory reports that managers used to see, the DSS included
a recommended price for every category in a group, and the forecasted revenue corresponding
to that price. In addition, managers could introduce another value of the price and the DSS
would show them its forecasted revenue. With this information, managers confirmed the
final price to be implemented for every category.
In S2008 a pilot test of the DSS in two countries resulted in a 5.8% increase in the
revenue metric Y . After that, the DSS was implemented gradually (until 2012) in all other
countries. It was obligatory for managers from own-store countries to use this tool and
observe its recommendations, while franchise managers could set the prices using any other
system, although the DSS was also available to them and they were equally trained to use
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it.
Managers were incentivized to maximize revenue, and the DSS’s recommendations were
proven to increase it. However, managers’ adherence to such recommendations was initially
low. For instance, in W2010 it was 57% (61% for own-store countries and 46% for franchises).
More specifically, when managers deviated from the DSS’s recommendations they usually
did so by setting prices that were lower than the recommended ones (see Figure 2.2). A
common way in which deviations occurred was that the DSS recommended keeping the price
of a category unchanged, but the manager marked it down anyway. Observing managers’
low adherence to the DSS’s recommendations, particularly in franchises, Zara performed
two interventions aimed to increase it. We study their effect in detail in Section 2.4. As we
can see in Figure 2.2 (right), adherence was higher after the interventions, especially that of
franchises.
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Figure 2.2: Pricing decisions in W2010 (left) and in W2013 (right), for all countries (first
bar of each plot), countries in which Zara owns the stores (second bar), and countries in
which stores are franchises (third bar).
2.3.3 Data Description
To study the effect of the two interventions and the drivers of managers’ adherence to
the DSS’s recommendations, we use a dataset collected by Zara, which spans seven sales
campaigns over 3.5 years, from W2010 to W2013. Our data contains 20 women’s apparel
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groups. Due to Zara’s constant expansion, the number of countries in our data increases from
53 in W2010 to 84 in W2013. Two countries were dismissed because Zara discontinued its
presence there due to social and political conflicts. For each country, campaign, and group,
the dataset contains all pricing decisions made by that country’s manager for all clusters in
that group and all weeks in that campaign.
We separately gathered information from Zara’s annual reports regarding the number of
stores in each country and year, as well as the type of country (own stores or franchises).
Two countries in our data changed store ownership type in 2013. However, as we will see in
the following sections, this does not affect our analyses.
Table 2.1 shows one observation in our original dataset. In this example, from W2010
in France (where Zara owns its stores, 113 in total), the cluster of women’s outerwear that
had been priced at Xe during the regular season (regular price column) was priced at Ye
during week 6 of clearance sales (previous price). In week 7, the DSS recommended keeping
its price unchanged at Ye (DSS price), but the manager decided to mark it down to Ze
(confirmed price). At the beginning of week 7, there were 183 units of this cluster in all the
country, of which 93 were sold by the end of the week. All women’s outerwear unsold by the
end of W2010 would be salvaged at Se/unit.
Given that our data was collected at the cluster level, but managers made their pricing
decisions at the category level (i.e., only one pricing decision for all clusters that belonged
to the same category at a given time), we need to aggregate our data by categories. We
identify a category, in a given week, as the set of clusters within a group whose price in the
previous week was the same. In the example in Table 2.1, all clusters of women’s outerwear
with previous price equal to $Y would form a category in week 7. We then aggregate the
category’s inventory, sales, etc. and compute all the variables we need for our analysis from
the category-aggregate dataset. After aggregating by category, our data contains 374,366
observations. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 contain summary statistics of the countries and categories
in our data.
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Country Campaign Type Num. stores Group Cluster Week
France W2010 Own stores 113 Women’s outerwear C 7
Initial inventory Quantity sold Regular price Previous price DSS price Confirmed price Salvage value
183 93 Xe Ye Ye Ze Se
Table 2.1: One observation in our original data set. The price information has been disguised.
Mean St. dev. Min. Max. % Countries % Observations % Adh. (W2010) % Adh. (W2013)
Country descriptive statistics:
Number of stores (W2010) 15.94 41.74 0 333 - - - -
Number of stores (W2013) 21.18 43.87 1 323 - - - -
Number of campaigns using -
the DSS (as of W2013) 7.12 0.85 3 11 - - - -
Country type:
Zara owns the stores - - - - 51.22 57.12 61.03 65.67
Stores are franchises - - - - 48.78 42.88 46.34 62.47
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of the countries in our data.
Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max. % times
Inventory at the beginning of the sales campaign 3,182.5 371 12,552.2 1 559,014 -
Weekly sales 539.7 44 2,526.3 0 217,809 -
The DSS recommends to markdown - - - - - 39.60
% markdown recommended by the DSS
(given that it recommends to markdown) 29.74 25.64 11.79 7.75 97.49 -
The country manager decides to markdown - - - - - 47.38
% markdown chosen by the country manager
(given that the manager decided to markdown) 27.67 25.03 10.97 -75.0 98.0 -
The country manager decides to deviate
from the DSS’s recommended price - - - - - 39.10
% deviation from the DSS’s recommendation
(given that the manager chose to deviate) 30.73 25.01 37.40 0.226 3,052.6 -
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of the categories (observations) in our data.
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2.4. Effect of Two Interventions
2.4.1 Context
As we have seen in Section 2.3.2, managers’ initial adherence was low, and they often deviated
by setting prices lower than the recommended ones, and by marking products down when the
DSS recommended keeping their prices unchanged. Zara performed two interventions, in the
form of changes to the DSS’s interface, with the objective to increase managers’ adherence.
In this section, we analyze the effect of those interventions. The analysis in this paper was
performed independently by the authors and it is not the responsibility of the Inditex group.
2.4.1.1 The Revenue Metric Intervention.
In S2011 the DSS started displaying the revenue metric Y that its price optimization al-
gorithm was maximizing (detailed in Section 2.3.2). The purpose of this intervention was
to give real-time feedback to managers on their performance and to shift salience from the
inventory metrics they were used to seeing in the weekly report (and the physical inventory
in the stores) to the revenue they were expected to maximize.
The positive role of feedback on decision making is well studied (Hogarth 1981, Klein-
muntz 1985, Bolton and Katok 2008), as well as the effect of making implicit quantities
more salient. For instance, in Chetty et al. (2009), making taxes salient decreased consumer
demand by 8%. In the context of utilities, the implementation of smart meters to show users
real-time feedback (and so to increase the salience of their consumption) decreased demand
and enticed resource conservation (Gilbert and Zivin 2014, Tiefenbeck et al. 2016).
We hypothesize that Intervention 1 had a positive effect on adherence because, by in-
creasing the salience of revenue, managers’ objective became more aligned with the DSS’s.
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2.4.1.2 The Reference Point Intervention.
In S2012 Zara made a second change in the DSS’s interface: showing a reference point for
the metric Y , to make the revenue metric easier to interpret. The reference point was the
manager’s own Y in the previous year for the same group and week, as well as the previous
year’s final Y for that group.
The ability to evaluate a quantity in relation to another is part of the number sense
framework proposed by McIntosh et al. (1992). Numeracy research shows that decision
makers may not use numbers until they are contrasted with available data to determine
their meaning (Peters et al. 2006, Peters 2012). Barrio et al. (2016) show that reference
points substantially improve people’s ability to understand numerical measurements.
We hypothesize that Intervention 2 helped managers interpret the Y metric, which in-
creased its weight in the decision making process. Therefore it aligned managers’ objective
with the DSS’s further, increasing manager’s adherence to the DSS’s recommendations
2.4.2 Methods
2.4.2.1 Effect on Adherence.
The company rolled out the interventions for all country managers at the same time. How-
ever, we can exploit a specific characteristic in the structure of our data to study the effect of
the interventions: managers’ split between countries in which Zara owns the stores and coun-
tries where stores are franchises (see Section 2.3). In practice, this implied that own-store
country managers actively provided feedback on the DSS’s interface and helped improve it:
both interventions were deployed after their feedback so, for those managers, interventions
were mostly endogenous. Oppositely, franchise country managers did not participate in the
development of the DSS, so the two interventions were exogenous to them, and mostly tar-
geted to them, as they were the ones showing the lowest adherence. Therefore, we label
own-store countries as the control group and franchise countries as the treatment group, and
use the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator to compute the effect of each intervention
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on franchise countries versus own-store countries. We use the binary variable Franchisei,
which takes value 1 for franchises, in our DiD regression. Two countries changed type in the
period in which our data was collected: Finland and Kazakhstan used to be franchises and
became own-store countries, but these changes took place in S2013, so they do not affect our
analysis.
Given that the assortment of categories within groups changes every season, but groups
do not, we need to aggregate our outcome of interest at the product group level to make the
units of observation comparable in the pre- and post- intervention periods. We define the
group-aggregate adherence of manager i and campaign t for group g as
Adherenceitg =
∑
w∈W(t)
∑
c∈C(g) I(Pricewc = PriceDSSwc)
|W(t)| × |C(g)| ,
where c indexes categories, C(g) is the set of categories in group g, w indexes weeks, W(t)
is the set of weeks in campaign t, PriceDSSwc is the price suggested by the DSS, Pricewc
is the price implemented by the country manager, and I(·) refers to the indicator function.
To measure the effect of each intervention separately, we use the data corresponding
to the campaigns immediately before and immediately after it took place. For instance, to
measure the effect of Intervention 1, which took place in S2011, we only use data from W2010
(pre-intervention, Int1t = 0) and S2011 (post-intervention, Int1t = 1). Additionally, given
that the DSS was implemented gradually and some country managers started being able to
use it after one or both interventions had taken place, we only use data from countries that
were already using the DSS before each intervention.
We obtain our effect of interest by estimating the following linear regression using OLS
Adherenceitg = α + βInt1t + γFranchisei + δInt1t × Franchisei + εitg,
where the estimate of δ is the DiD coefficient. To study the effect of Intervention 2, we
use Int2t instead if Int1t. We cluster the standard errors at the country level. More details
on using linear regression for DiD estimation can be found in Angist and Pischke (2009).
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To strengthen our analysis, given the lack of randomization between treatment and con-
trol groups, we propose two alternative splits based on managers’ adherence prior to each
intervention. Indeed, the interventions’ goal was to increase adherence. Hence, they were
not aimed towards those who were already adhering the most, but towards those who were
adhering the least. More specifically, we compute every manager’s average adherence prior
to each intervention. We then find the percentile 75 of this variable for each intervention, and
label managers below these thresholds as low-adherence managers using the binary variable
LowAdherence75i = 1. We repeat the same procedure using percentile 90, and build the
variable LowAdherence90i. In both cases, managers who showed low adherence before each
intervention are the treatment group.
2.4.2.2 Effect on Marking Down When the DSS Recommended Staying Put.
In addition to studying adherence, we want to measure the effect of the interventions on
managers’ likelihood to mark products down when the DSS was recommending keeping
their price unchanged, as this was a very common way in which they deviated from the
DSS’s recommendations. We compute the probability of each manager marking a product
down conditional on the DSS recommending keeping its price unchanged as
CMarkdownitg =
∑
w∈W(t)
∑
c∈C(g) I (Pricewc < Pricew−1,c)× I (PriceDSSwc = Pricew−1,c)∑
w∈W(t)
∑
c∈C(g) I (PriceDSSwc = Pricew−1,c)
and repeat the previous DiD analysis with this dependent variable. Note that, for some
countries and groups, the DSS always recommended marking down, so CMarkdownitg is
not defined, and there are fewer observations of this variable than there are of Adherenceitg.
2.4.3 Results and Discussion
2.4.3.1 Effect on Adherence.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of managers’ adherence per campaign, for own-store coun-
tries and franchises separately. It seems that the average adherence of these two country
types did not change when Intervention 1 took place (S2011). However, after Intervention 2
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was performed, in S2012, franchises’ adherence increased dramatically.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of managers’ adherence to the DSS’s recommendations by cam-
paign, for own-store countries (green) and franchises (pink). The dotted line marks when
Intervention 1 took place (S2011), and the dashed line marks Intervention 2 (S2012).
In Table 2.4 we can see the coefficients of the DiD estimation for both interventions,
where the dependent variable is managers’ adherence Adherenceitg. Intervention 1 did not
have a significant effect on franchises respect to own-store countries. However, it did have
a slightly significant effect (p < 0.05) on country managers with a past of low adherence.
When we label LowAdherence75i as treated, their increase in adherence is 4.2 percentage
points; the effect size is 4.99 percentage points if we we label LowAdherence90i as treated.
In contrast, Intervention 2 does show a positive effect, significant at the 0.001 level, for
all three treated/control splits. When it took place, franchises’ adherence increased by 9.1
percentage points. In countries where LowAdherence75i = 1, adherence increased by 9.83
percentage points. If we use LowAdherence90i as treated, their adherence increased by 10.9
percentage points. Note that own-store countries’ adherence also increased after Intervention
2 (by 2.78 percentage points), and this increase may be also explained by the intervention.
Franchises, who were arguably the target of the interventions, experienced an increase in
adherence which is more than 4 times that of own-store countries. In total, franchises’
adherence increased by 25% after the second intervention.
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Intervention 1
Adherence
(1) (2) (3)
Int1 0.0109 -0.0166 -0.0332
(0.00767) (0.0118) (0.0197)
Franchise -0.145∗∗∗
(0.0280)
Int1×Franchise 0.00655
(0.0265)
LowAdherence75 -0.171∗∗∗
(0.0172)
Int1×LowAdherence75 0.0420∗
(0.0183)
LowAdherence90 -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0194)
Int1×LowAdherence90 0.0499∗
(0.0230)
Constant 0.606∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.00708) (0.0116)
N 2216 2216 2216
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Intervention 2
Adherence
(1) (2) (3)
Int2 0.0278∗∗ -0.00443 -0.0284
(0.0103) (0.0121) (0.0183)
Franchise -0.122∗∗∗
(0.0222)
Int2×Franchise 0.0910∗∗∗
(0.0265)
LowAdherence75 -0.149∗∗∗
(0.0171)
Int2×LowAdherence75 0.0983∗∗∗
(0.0204)
LowAdherence90 -0.170∗∗∗
(0.0160)
Int2×LowAdherence90 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0233)
Constant 0.593∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0103) (0.00960)
N 2999 2999 2999
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4: Effect of Intervention 1 (left) and Intervention 2 (right) on adherence, using
own-store countries as the control group and franchises are the treated (1), managers in the
top quartile of pre-intervention adherence as the control group (2), and managers in the top
decile of pre-intervention adherence as the control group (3).
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2.4.3.2 Effect on Marking Down When the DSS Recommended Staying Put.
What was the effect of the interventions on CMarkdownitg? As shown in Figure 2.4, after
Intervention 2 the frequency at which franchise managers marked products down when the
DSS did not recommend it decreased, but it is unclear if Intervention 1 had any effect.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of managers’ probability of marking a product down when the DSS
recommended keeping its price unchanged, by campaign, for own-store countries (green) and
franchises (pink). The dotted line marks when Intervention 1 took place (S2011), and the
dashed line marks Intervention 2 (S2012).
Do the numerical results back up this claim? Indeed, for Intervention 1, the DiD coeffi-
cient is only statistically significant (p < 0.01) when the control is the set of managers such
that LowAdherence90i = 1 (column 3 of Table 2.5, left), but it is not for the other two
splits. Nevertheless, Intervention 2 decreased franchise managers’ likelihood to markdown
when recommended to keep a price unchanged by 22.5 percentage points (p < 0.001), and
this estimate is 15.8 and 14.5 for the other two control/treated splits, respectively.
To summarize, the Intervention 1 did not have a robust effect on either managers’ ad-
herence or managers’ willingness to markdown when they should not, but the Intervention 2
did, and this effect is robust across three different control/treated splits. What these results
suggest is that, consistent with the literature on numeracy and number sense, managers did
not fully understand the meaning of the revenue metric Y in isolation, and thus they did not
necessarily use this information when it was available to them. However, when they were
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Intervention 1
CMarkdown
(1) (2) (3)
Int1 0.00437 0.0215 0.0664∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0176)
Franchise 0.279∗∗∗
(0.0432)
Int1×Franchise -0.0641
(0.0357)
LowAdherence75 0.167∗∗∗
(0.0329)
Int1×LowAdherence75 -0.0458
(0.0241)
LowAdherence90 0.142∗∗∗
(0.0315)
Int1×LowAdherence90 -0.0833∗∗
(0.0240)
Constant 0.279∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.00959) (0.0163)
N 2172 2172 2172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Intervention 2
CMarkdown
(1) (2) (3)
Int2 -0.00230 0.0119 0.0234
(0.0113) (0.0151) (0.0135)
Franchise 0.185∗∗∗
(0.0257)
Int2×Franchise -0.225∗∗∗
(0.0300)
LowAdherence75 0.146∗∗∗
(0.0256)
Int2×LowAdherence75 -0.158∗∗∗
(0.0274)
LowAdherence90 0.154∗∗∗
(0.0282)
Int2×LowAdherence90 -0.145∗∗∗
(0.0247)
Constant 0.285∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0175) (0.0224)
N 2972 2972 2972
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.5: Effect of Intervention 1 (left) and Intervention 2 (right) on managers’ probability
of marking a product down when the DSS recommended keeping its price unchanged, using
own-store countries as the control group and franchises are the treated (1), managers in the
top quartile of pre-intervention adherence as the control group (2), and managers in the top
decile of pre-intervention adherence as the control group (3).
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shown a reference point for Y , which helped them make sense of this metric, their behavior
significantly changed towards higher adherence to the DSS’s recommendations.
2.5. Drivers of Adherence to the DSS’s Recommendations
2.5.1 Context
In our data, variation in adherence behavior is not only driven by individual differences
between country managers or product groups. In other words, we do not observe managers
who systematically adhered or deviated, or high adherence for shirts but low for blazers, etc.
Instead, any given country manager made different adherence decisions in different weeks. In
this section, we analyze the behavioral drivers of their adherence decisions for each product
and week.
2.5.2 Hypotheses
2.5.2.1 Preference for the Status Quo.
Before the implementation of the DSS, managers typically used the following rule of thumb:
they checked the estimated time to sell the remaining stock of each category at its current
price, which was computed using that category’s speed of sales in the previous three days
and, if there was a substantial risk of unsold inventory of that category at the end of the cam-
paign, they would mark it down; otherwise, they would leave the current price unchanged.
We hypothesize that, once the DSS was implemented, managers were (possibly implicitly)
expecting it to follow the same heuristic and, hence, they were more likely to deviate when
the DSS’s recommendation was inconsistent with this rule. The interventions, by making it
explicit that the objective was not to sell everything out but to maximize revenue, helped
managers understand that their previous rule of thumb was not aligned with their objective,
and so after they took place managers stopped expecting the DSS to follow that simple
heuristic. This is an instance of status quo bias; people’s preference for their current de-
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cisions or the current state has been widely documented (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988,
Kahneman et al. 1991).
Hypothesis 5. Managers were more likely to deviate from the price recommendation when
it was not consistent with the heuristic they used before the DSS’s implementation.
2.5.2.2 Salience of the Inventory and the Speed of Sales.
Until the interventions took place, the inventory and sales metrics that they used in the past
were also emphasized in the DSS’s interface. Hence, these variables were more salient to
managers than the revenue. Moreover, inventory is material and visible, so possibly more
salient than a forecast of revenue, a more abstract concept. We hypothesize that managers
set prices trying to sell all inventory out, instead of maximizing revenue. If salience of the
inventory was driving the magnitude of their price deviations, then the interventions, which
made the Y metric more salient, mitigated this effect. Salience is a cognitive bias well
described in Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Bordalo et al. (2013).
Hypothesis 6. Managers deviated from the DSS’s recommendation by a smaller amount
when a product had a high speed of sales and a low inventory level.
2.5.2.3 Loss Aversion.
Loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Camerer 1998, Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2006) could
also be leading managers to set prices with the objective of selling all inventory out. In this
setting, loss aversion would manifest itself in the following way: managers would have an
internal preferred price for each product, based on their own past training and experience; the
DSS would recommend a different price, possibly higher, which managers would encode as a
gain; however, when comparing it to the loss from having to salvage unsold inventory, they
overweighted the expected loss over the expected gain, and they decided to deviate from the
recommendation. If loss aversion was driving the probability and magnitude of managers’
price deviations from the DSS, higher salvage values should decrease the perceived loss from
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unsold inventory, aligning managers’ objective with revenue maximization, and hence making
their pricing decisions more similar to the DSS’s recommendations.
Hypothesis 7. Managers were less likely to deviate from the DSS’s recommendation or, if
they decided to deviate, they deviated by a smaller amount, when a product’s salvage value
was high.
2.5.2.4 Cognitive Limitations.
The large amount of product groups (20 corresponding to women’s apparel, plus many
others) and number of clusters per group (up to 25 in our data) implies that managers had
hundreds of prices to set every week, based on an equally large amount of inventory and sales
metrics (and revenue, after the interventions). However, research shows that humans have
limited cognitive capacity in complex decision making settings (Kahneman 1973). Moreover,
when information acquisition is costly it can be rational to deviate from optimal decisions to
respond to the trade-off between the effort of analyzing new data and the cost of deviating
from optimality (Sims 2003, Cheremukhin et al. 2011, Caplin and Dean 2015). In the DSS,
managers were able to observe metrics of inventory and speed of sales for every category, but
also the group-aggregate ones (which were emphasized). Given the huge amount of groups
and clusters, ignoring the category-level metrics in favor of the group-level ones would greatly
facilitate their work. In addition, it would make sense for them to reduce the number of
pricing decisions to make (and of metrics to inspect) by grouping different clusters into
categories. As described in Section 2.3.1, once two clusters’ prices coalesce, they become
one category, and the manager needs to make one common pricing decision, instead of two,
in the subsequent weeks. The DSS’s algorithm did not take the number of categories per
group into account. Therefore, if they were trying to reduce this number (at the expense of
revenue), they would need to deviate from the DSS’s recommendations.
Hypothesis 8. (a) Managers were trying to minimize the number of distinct prices to as-
sign to products, i.e., the number of product categories.
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(b) Managers were paying more attention to group-aggregate metrics than to individual cat-
egory ones when setting prices for each category.
2.5.3 Methods
To test our hypotheses, we need to use a regression model that accounts for the nature of
manager’s pricing decision process: first, the manager observes the DSS’s price recommen-
dation for that category, and decides whether to adhere or to deviate; second, in case they
decide to deviate, they set their preferred price. For this reason, we use the Heckman model,
also called Heckit. This is a two-step estimator that models a decision process of this type.
In the first step, the manager decides whether to adhere or to deviate from the DSS’s recom-
mendation. This is called the selection part and it is modeled like a probit regression. In the
second step, provided that the manager has decided to deviate, they decide by how much.
This is called the deviation part and is estimated as a linear regression which contains a
term that corrects for the selection decision of the first step. The standard errors are robust,
following Heckman (1977). Additional details of this method can be found in Wooldridge
(2010), Cameron and Trivedi (2005), and Greene (2007).
We test Hypotheses 5, 6, 7 and 8(a) using the covariates we describe below. Hypothesis
8(b) states that managers were focusing on group-aggregate metrics. To test it, we run
the Heckman regression in two slightly different ways: (1) with covariates computed at the
category level; (2) with covariates computed at the group level. We then compare which one
of these two variations shows higher coefficient estimates.
2.5.3.1 Dependent Variables.
Selection part. The first step of the Heckman estimator models the probability of devi-
ating from the DSS’s recommended price. Therefore, its dependent variable is binary, and
takes value 1 if the manager’s confirmed price for category c in week w is different from the
recommended one, i.e., Deviatedwc = I (Pricewc 6= PriceDSSwc) .
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Deviation part. The second step of this regression models the amount of deviation. We
compute the difference between the manager’s confirmed price and the DSS’s recommen-
dation and, to make this difference comparable across products, we divide it by the DSS’s
recommended price (otherwise expensive products would have larger price differences). We
take the absolute value of this normalized price difference to be able to interpret our results
in terms of price deviations respect to the DSS, and not in terms of higher or lower prices.
Hence, the dependent variable in the deviation part of the Heckman model is defined as
AbsDeviationwc =
∣∣∣∣Pricewc − PriceDSSwcPriceDSSwc
∣∣∣∣ .
2.5.3.2 Independent Variables.
Disagreement between the DSS and managers’ previous heuristics. To test Hy-
pothesis 5, we compute the binary variable DisagreeSSwc, which takes value 1 if the DSS’s
recommendation was consistent with the previous rule of thumb, and 0 otherwise. To com-
pute it, we use the continuous variable StockoutWeekwc defined below.
More specifically, a category is predicted to sell out before the end of the campaign if
StockoutWeekwc ≤ 12, and a group is predicted to do so if StockoutWeekwg ≤ 12. The
variable DisagreeSSwc, computed at the category level, takes value 1 if either the category
is predicted to sell out (StockoutWeekwc ≤ 12) but the DSS is recommending to markdown,
or if c is predicted not to sell out (StockoutWeekwc > 12) but the DSS is recommending
not to markdown. Analogously, the variable DisagreeDSSwg takes value 1 if the group to
which category c belongs is predicted to sell out (StockoutWeekwg ≤ 12) but the DSS is
recommending to mark c down, or if g is predicted not to sell out (StockoutWeekwg > 12)
but the DSS is recommending not to mark c down.
We include this variable in the selection part of the Heckman regression: if there is a
disagreement between the DSS and their beliefs, they will be more likely to to deviate.
65
Stockout period. To test Hypothesis 6, we build a variable based on one of the metrics
contained in the DSS’s interface, the rotation (described in Section 2.3.2). However, this
metric would tend to capture a time trend (the remaining time to sell all inventory out is
nonincreasing). Instead, we compute the period in which every category will be sold out
if the speed of sales is the same as in the previous week. For week w and category c, this
variable is defined as
StockoutWeekwc = w +
InventoryLevelwc
Salesw−1,c
.
To study the effect of group-aggregate metrics, we use them to compute, for group g,
StockoutWeekwg = w +
InventoryLevelwg
Salesw−1,g
.
Note that, if there have been no sales for a given category or group in a given week,
these variables will not be defined. Or, if the sales have been very small compared to the
inventory levels, these variables will take a value in the order of thousands. However, the
clearance sales campaigns spans a limited period of time (typically 12 weeks). Therefore, we
assume that managers are not sensitive to when exactly the category would be sold out if
this is not going to occur even after multiple campaigns, and we cap StockoutWeekwc and
StockoutWeekwg by setting any value of these variables greater than 24 to take value 24.
We include this variable in the deviation part of the Heckman estimator: we hypothesize
that the exact amount of inventory that remains to be sold is related to the exact amount
by which they deviate from the DSS’s recommendation.
Salvage value. To make salvage values comparable across product groups and categories,
we need to normalize them to the same scale. Given that managers set prices weekly, they
should update beliefs on what their preferred prices are (and what the loss for salvaging
products is) weekly, using the last price they set for that category as a reference point. We
66
compute the relative salvage value of category c in week w as
RelSalvageV aluewc =
SalvageV aluewc
Pricew−1,c
.
We include this variable in both the selection and the deviation parts of the Heckman
regression, since loss aversion can play a role in both the probability of deviating and the
magnitude of price deviations, as explained in Hypothesis 7.
Number of product categories. We denote the number of different product categories
in group g and week w as NumCategswg, and we use this variable to test Hypothesis 8(a).
Intervention stage. In Section 2.4 we have seen that Intervention 2 had a significant effect
on adherence. To better understand the relationship between the covariates defined above
and managers’ adherence, we need to study how the interventions changed that relationship.
For this reason, we define three binary variables, which represent different periods in our
data: Baselinet takes value 1 if t = W2010, i.e., before the interventions; Int1t takes value
1 if t ∈ {S2011,W2011}, i.e., after Intervention 1 but before Intervention 2; Int2t takes
value 1 if t ∈ {S2012,W2012, S2013,W2013}, after Intervention 2. We interact these three
dummies with the covariates defined above to observe if the interventions changed the extent
at which our covariates were related to adherence.
Control variables. We control for the number of stores in each country and campaign
(LogNumStoresit, in logarithmic scale) and the number of campaigns that the manager had
been using the DSS (ExperienceWithDSSit). Additionally, we include the following dummy
variables in both parts of the Heckman estimation: country type (own stores or franchises),
season (spring-summer or fall-winter), week, year, product group, and country.
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2.5.4 Results and Discussion
2.5.4.1 Selection Part.
Table 2.6 shows the coefficient estimates for the selection part of the Heckman regression, and
Table 2.7 its corresponding average partial effects (APEs). From the APEs table, columns
1 to 3, we can see that, before the interventions, when there was a disagreement between
the DSS’s recommendation and the managers’ previous heuristic the manager was 17.1 per-
centage points (or 45%) more likely to deviate; after the first intervention, they were 10.5
percentage points (or 28% of their adherence on that period); after the second interven-
tion, this number had reduced to 6.05 percentage points (or 17%). All these APEs are all
statistically significant at the 0.001 level. These numbers are higher when we run the regres-
sion using own-store countries only (19.2, 16.3 and 11.6 percentage points) than when we
use only franchises. In particular, this APE is negative for franchises after Intervention 1,
and insignificant after Intervention 2. When a different model specification is used (see the
robustness checks in the E-Companion), this variable is not statistically significant for fran-
chises at any stage of the interventions, but is for own-store countries. These results provide
support for Hypothesis 5: managers, particularly from own-store countries, were more likely
to deviate from the DSS when its recommendation was not aligned with the rule they had
been following before its implementation, and the interventions mitigated this behavior. It
is unclear that managers from franchise countries were following the rule of thumb as strictly
as own-store country managers, given that they purchased the inventory and then used their
own pricing systems, and that may be the reason why the effect of agreement between the
heuristic and the DSS is weak.
For own-store country managers, the relative salvage value has a negative, statistically
significant APE in all stages, and its magnitude actually increases after each intervention.
Given the average relative salvage value in our data, a 10% higher salvage value of a category
is related to a 2.1 percentage points (5.8%) in the probability of deviating from the DSS’s
recommendation before the interventions, and this effect is 2.54 percentage points (roughly
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7%) after Intervention 1 and 3.05 percentage points after Intervention 2 (or 9%). This
provides support for Hypothesis 7: a higher salvage value decreased their probability of
deviating from the DSS’s recommendations, showing that their pricing decisions were affected
by loss aversion. However, the interventions did not mitigate this bias but, instead, it
increased with time.
The number of categories in the group also influenced managers’ willingness to adhere to
the DSS’s recommendations, especially for own-store country managers. Before the interven-
tions, every additional category in a group increased by 1.08 percentage points the probability
they would deviate. After Intervention 1, this number was 0.73, but after Intervention 2 it
increased again to 1.2 percentage points. All these APEs are statistically significant at the
0.001 level. For franchise mangers, before the second intervention the number of categories
was insignificant, but after it was 1.13 percentage points (p < 0.001). In the robustness
checks (see the E-Companion), the number of categories is only statistically significant after
Intervention 2. These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 8(a): managers, after
the second intervention particularly, were trying to reduce the number of pricing decisions
(categories) to make every week, and this lead them to deviate from the DSS’s recommen-
dations. When the disagreement variable is computed using group-aggregate inventory and
sales (columns 4 to 6), its effect is 22.1 (before the interventions), 12.4 (after Intervention
1) and 6.89 percentage points (after Intervention 2). These coefficients are all higher than
when the disagreement variable is computed using category metrics. This supports Hy-
pothesis 8(b): when making pricing decisions for individual categories, managers were more
influenced by the group-aggregate metrics than by category-level ones.
2.5.4.2 Deviation Part.
Table 2.8 contains the coefficient estimates of the deviation part of the Heckman regression.
For own-store country managers, the speed of sales is significant at the 0.001 level for all
intervention stages, with coefficient 0.00698 (before any intervention), 0.00636 (after Inter-
vention 1), and 0.00676 (after Intervention 2). In other words, every additional week to sell a
69
ProbDeviation
All countries Own stores Franchises All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline×DisagreeDSSc 0.478∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0215) (0.0378)
Int1×DisagreeDSSc 0.296∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ -0.0563∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0146) (0.0185)
Int2×DisagreeDSSc 0.175∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.0117
(0.00621) (0.00893) (0.00882)
Baseline×DisagreeDSSg 0.621∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0218) (0.0384)
Int1×DisagreeDSSg 0.350∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ -0.0361
(0.0114) (0.0147) (0.0185)
Int2×DisagreeDSSg 0.200∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.0186∗
(0.00625) (0.00902) (0.00883)
Baseline×RelSalvageValue -2.804∗∗∗ -2.627∗∗∗ -2.812∗∗∗ -2.581∗∗∗
(0.0628) (0.0825) (0.0636) (0.0837)
Int1×RelSalvageValue -2.691∗∗∗ -3.175∗∗∗ -2.634∗∗∗ -3.110∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0630) (0.0466) (0.0634)
Int2×RelSalvageValue -2.492∗∗∗ -3.813∗∗∗ -2.457∗∗∗ -3.746∗∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0441) (0.0351) (0.0442)
Baseline×NumCategs -0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗ -0.0198 -0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ -0.0259∗
(0.00615) (0.00791) (0.0104) (0.00619) (0.00798) (0.0104)
Int1×NumCategs -0.00709 0.0224∗∗∗ -0.000819 -0.00734 0.0202∗∗∗ -0.000392
(0.00400) (0.00576) (0.00571) (0.00400) (0.00579) (0.00571)
Int2×NumCategs 0.0384∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0357∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗
(0.00210) (0.00311) (0.00293) (0.00211) (0.00312) (0.00293)
ExperienceWithDSS -0.370∗∗ 0.346∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ 0.334∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.138) (0.0193) (0.115) (0.138) (0.0193)
LogNumStores 0.0355 0.0372 -0.0540 0.0354 0.0339 -0.0542
(0.0193) (0.0271) (0.0285) (0.0193) (0.0272) (0.0285)
Franchise -0.139∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0335)
Constant 1.014∗∗∗ -0.918∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ -0.942∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.163) (0.0618) (0.162) (0.164) (0.0618)
N 294386 169137 125249 294386 169137 125249
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.6: Coefficients of the Heckman selection part (decision to deviate from the DSS’s
recommended price). Its corresponding average partial effects are shown in Table 2.7. Not
reported: week, season, year, group and country dummy variables.
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ProbDeviation
All countries Own stores Franchises All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline×DisagreeDSSc 0.171∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.0665∗∗∗
(0.00680) (0.00743) (0.0137)
Int1×DisagreeDSSc 0.105∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗
(0.00413) (0.00511) (0.00641)
Int2×DisagreeDSSc 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.00410
(0.00225) (0.00313) (0.00326)
Baseline×DisagreeDSSg 0.221∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.0962∗∗∗
(0.00676) (0.00734) (0.0139)
Int1×DisagreeDSSg 0.124∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ -0.0126
(0.00416) (0.00510) (0.00645)
Int2×DisagreeDSSg 0.0689∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.00652∗
(0.00226) (0.00317) (0.00327)
Baseline×RelSalvageValue -0.965∗∗∗ -0.860∗∗∗ -0.966∗∗∗ -0.840∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0272) (0.0225) (0.0269)
Int1×RelSalvageValue -0.926∗∗∗ -1.039∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -1.012∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0220) (0.0163) (0.0219)
Int2×RelSalvageValue -0.858∗∗∗ -1.248∗∗∗ -0.843∗∗∗ -1.219∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0139) (0.0113) (0.0139)
Baseline×NumCategs -0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ -0.00694 -0.0132∗∗∗ 0.00973∗∗∗ -0.00909∗
(0.00215) (0.00262) (0.00369) (0.00216) (0.00261) (0.00372)
Int1×NumCategs -0.00244 0.00732∗∗∗ -0.000287 -0.00252 0.00658∗∗∗ -0.000138
(0.00138) (0.00190) (0.00201) (0.00138) (0.00188) (0.00201)
Int2×NumCategs 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗
(0.000720) (0.00101) (0.00103) (0.000720) (0.00101) (0.00103)
ExperienceWithDSS -0.127∗∗ 0.113∗ -0.0483∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ 0.109∗ -0.0482∗∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0454) (0.00674) (0.0395) (0.0452) (0.00674)
LogNumStores 0.0122 0.0122 -0.0189 0.0122 0.0110 -0.0190
(0.00668) (0.00892) (0.00999) (0.00667) (0.00888) (0.00999)
Franchise -0.0474∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0110)
N 294366 169094 125249 294366 169094 125249
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.7: Average partial effects of the selection part of the Heckman regression on the
decision to deviate from the DSS’s recommended price and the magnitude of such deviation
(coefficient estimates in Table 2.6). Not reported: week, season, year, group and country
dummy variables.
71
category out, when mangers decide to deviate, is related to a 1.9% higher deviation from the
DSS’s recommendation for this category before the interventions, but after the interventions
this decreases to 1.35%. This supports Hypothesis 6. Moreover, it seems that the interven-
tions effectively shifted salience from inventory and speed of sales to revenue. However, in
contrast to our findings in the selection part, when the stockout week is computed for the
entire group, its coefficient is smaller than when it is computed for an individual category,
which contradicts Hypothesis 8(b). Moreover, the stockout week variable, computed at the
group level, is statistically insignificant in the robustness checks (see E-Companion).
The relative salvage value is statistically significant at the 0.001 level before Intervention
2, with coefficient estimate 0.175 (before Intervention 1) and 0.138 (after Intervention 1).
Taking into account the average salvage value, a 10% increase in it is related to 1.45% higher
price deviations from the DSS before the interventions, and 1.21% after Intervention 1. Even
though, as we have seen, a higher salvage value made managers less likely to deviate from the
DSS’s recommendation, it made the size of their deviations higher, which does not support
Hypothesis 7. The interventions decreased the importance that they placed on the salvage
value to determine the size of their deviations, to the point of making it insignificant it after
Intervention 2.
For franchise countries, the speed of sales, before any intervention, has coefficient 0.0066
(when the speed of sales is computed at the category level), and 0.00701 (when it is at the
group level), with p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively. After Intervention 1, these coefficients
are both statistically insignificant. After Intervention 2, these coefficients are 0.00428 and
0.00125, respectively (p < 0.001). Given franchises’ average size of their deviations, what
these numbers mean is that, before any intervention, an additional week to sell a group out
was related to a 4.8% larger price deviation, and this figure decreased to less than 1% after
the interventions. In particular, after the interventions their attention to speed of sales was
centered to category-level, and not group-level. These findings provide support for Hypoth-
esis 6, as the speed of sales is related to the magnitude of their deviations (except during
2011), and partial support for Hypothesis 8(b), as before the interventions the coefficient of
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speed of sales was higher when it is computed at he group level.
A possible explanation of the seemingly odd coefficients of speed of sales and disagreement
for franchises after Intervention 1 and before Intervention 2 is the following: during spring-
summer and fall-winter, 2011, franchise countries purchased more inventory in each one of
those campaigns than in fall-winter, 2010, but their sales dropped drastically (around 60%).
Therefore, it is likely that, at the speed of sales of most products on those two campaigns,
the DSS predicted that they would not be sold out during clearance sales. This explains why,
on those campaigns, franchise managers did not place any importance to the exact period
in which products would sell out (StockoutWeek is statistically insignificant, both when
computed at the category and at the group level), and disagreement between the DSS and
their heuristic has a negative effect (when computed at the category level) and is statistically
insignificant (when computed at the group level).
The coefficient estimates of the Mills ratio are statistically significant. This tests whether
our results would be different if we did not take into account the two-step nature of this
pricing process and we studied price deviations from the DSS using a linear regression. The
fact that this coefficient is statistically significant proves the need for using the Heckman
estimator, or any other two-step model, instead of a simpler method.
Finally, note that, although Intervention 1 did not have a significant effect on adher-
ence, the coefficient estimates of some of our covariates are smaller after that intervention
took place. In other words, Intervention 1 mitigated managers’ status quo bias, as well as
salience of the inventory and speed of sales. Although Intervention 1 was not sufficient to
increase managers’ adherence by itself, it did induce behavioral changes, paving the road for
Intervention 2.
2.6. Conclusion and Managerial Insights
When companies implement advanced solutions for their operational decision making, such
as optimization-based algorithms, they often do so in the form of a decision support system
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AbsDeviation
All countries Own stores Franchises All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline×StockoutWeekc 0.00630∗∗∗ 0.00698∗∗∗ 0.00660∗∗
(0.000924) (0.000754) (0.00208)
Int1×StockoutWeekc 0.00122∗∗∗ 0.00636∗∗∗ 0.000535
(0.000334) (0.000496) (0.000553)
Int2×StockoutWeekc 0.00464∗∗∗ 0.00676∗∗∗ 0.00428∗∗∗
(0.000205) (0.000258) (0.000323)
Baseline×StockoutWeekg 0.00236 0.00269∗∗ 0.00701∗
(0.00125) (0.00104) (0.00288)
Int1×StockoutWeekg -0.00104∗∗ 0.00184∗∗ -0.000376
(0.000348) (0.000604) (0.000562)
Int2×StockoutWeekg 0.00131∗∗∗ 0.00271∗∗∗ 0.00125∗∗∗
(0.000221) (0.000325) (0.000336)
Baseline×RelSalvageValue 0.0547 0.175∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0277) (0.0339) (0.0270)
Int1×RelSalvageValue 0.110∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0244) (0.0284) (0.0233)
Int2×RelSalvageValue -0.177∗∗∗ 0.00363 0.0722∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0237) (0.0264) (0.0220)
ExperienceWithDSS -0.0997∗ 0.229∗∗∗ -0.00769 -0.0816 0.212∗∗∗ -0.00634
(0.0477) (0.0387) (0.0117) (0.0482) (0.0396) (0.0119)
LogNumStores -0.0335∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.00768 -0.0409∗∗∗ -0.0501∗∗∗ -0.00928
(0.00819) (0.00756) (0.0157) (0.00828) (0.00774) (0.0161)
Franchise -0.0419∗∗ -0.0331∗
(0.0140) (0.0141)
Constant 0.612∗∗∗ 0.0145 0.451∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗
(0.0647) (0.0457) (0.0467) (0.0655) (0.0465) (0.0476)
Mills ratio 0.0421∗∗∗ 0.00539 -0.126∗ -0.0946∗∗∗ -0.0783∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.00716) (0.0567) (0.0108) (0.00639) (0.0551)
N 294386 169137 125249 294386 169137 125249
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.8: Coefficients of the Heckman deviation part (magnitude of price deviations). Not
reported: week, season, year, group and country dummy variables.
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(DSS), a tool that suggests optimal decisions to human decision makers but allows them to
deviate from such recommendations. The success of a DSS’s implementation, and hence its
effect on the firm’s performance, depends on decision makers’ adherence to its suggestions.
Therefore, it is critical that we understand how human decision makers interact with such
tools to design them in a way that entices managers to adhere to their recommendations.
In this paper, we use data collected by Zara during seven clearance sales campaigns to
study managers’ adherence to price recommendations from a DSS. Although adhering to
the DSS’s recommendations was associated to higher revenue, mangers’ initial adherence
was very low. The firm performed two interventions, in the form of changes in the DSS’s
interface, with the objective to increase adherence. We analyze the effect of the interventions
using a difference-in-differences analysis. We find that Intervention 2 had a strong, positive
effect on adherence, and also significantly decreased managers’ likelihood to mark a product
down when the DSS recommended leaving its price unchanged. Intervention 1 had a small
effect in countries with low pre-DSS adherence but not on franchises compared to own-store
countries.
We investigate the drivers of managers’ adherence using a Heckman regression, and relate
them to cognitive biases. Managers were significantly more likely to implement the DSS’s
suggested prices when such recommendations were consistent with the rule of thumb they
were trained to follow in the past, which can be explained by with status quo bias. When a
product was selling quickly, managers’ price deviations from the DSS were smaller, which can
be attributed to salience of the inventory respect to a revenue forecast. When products had a
large salvage value, managers were less likely to deviate from the recommended prices, but the
magnitude of their deviations when they did not adhere was slightly higher, which provides
partial evidence of loss aversion. The effect of some group-aggregate metrics on adherence
was higher than that of individual product metrics. Moreover, managers were trying to
reduce the number of distinct number of prices to assign to products. This is consistent with
inattention and cognitive limitations. The interventions mitigated managers’ status quo bias
and effectively shifted salience from inventory to revenue, but did not eliminate managers’
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loss aversion and inattention. Moreover, although Intervention 1 did not have a significant
effect on adherence, it did have an impact on the extent at which status quo bias and salience
were related to adherence decisions, which Intervention 2 further changed. In other words,
Intervention 1 induced changes in behavior that helped pave the way for Intervention 2.
More generally, we have shown empirically that the way DSS’s interfaces are designed
and the information they display can have a great impact on how decision makers use them,
how much they adhere to their recommendations and, ultimately, on the success of their
implementation and the goodness of their operational decisions.
Our findings provide a few managerial insights for any company that wants to implement
a DSS, or any other analytical tool to be adopted voluntarily by its users. First, the firm
should make sure decision makers’ objectives and incentives are aligned with the firm’s.
However, this may not be enough to ensure managers’ decisions are optimal. In our work,
managers were incentivized to increase revenue, but they acted like they were inventory
minimizers. The fact that a change in the DSS’s interface significantly altered their behavior
shows us that we can achieve a greater alignment between the firm’s objectives and managers’
behavior when the DSS makes such objectives salient. Second, the firm should provide
training and explicitly teach any change in rules and policies: managers in our data were
expecting the DSS to suggest decisions in line with their previous rule of thumb, but this was
not the heuristic that he algorithm was following. Third, the DSS’s interface should provide
a reference to make sense of any quantitative information, given that human decision makers
are not very good at interpreting numbers. Finally, as we have seen in our work, managers’
deviations can be partially explained by the large amount of prices to set and information to
process, and this behavior persisted over all the data-collection period. Firms that want to
implement a DSS but leave the final decision making responsibility to managers should be
mindful of humans’ finite cognitive capacity, and minimize the amount of information that
managers need to process, as well as the number simultaneous decisions that they need to
make.
Our work has, of course, numerous limitations. Regarding internal validity, the fact that
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our data is observational and not a controlled experiment means that we cannot make a
strong claim of causality in any of our findings. In addition, other factors could be playing
a role in managers’ adherence, such as trust in the accuracy of the demand and revenue
forecast, or demographic characteristics of managers. Unfortunately, the data collection was
performed by the company, and these variables are not available to us.
Additionally, our findings have limited external validity. The type of information dis-
played in the DSS’s interface, the company’s idiosyncratic pricing rules, the business model
in which all stores in a country have the same ownership type, etc. are specific to Zara. Nev-
ertheless, many other important fashion retailers have clearance sales periods which work
similarly to those in our data, so their pricing managers could be affected by the same cog-
nitive biases that we find. The importance of making objectives salient in the interface and
providing reference points for quantitative information can be extrapolated to any context
in which human managers make numerical decisions assisted by a DSS.
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CHAPTER 3
Loss Aversion in Managers’ Pricing Decision Making
at a Fast Fashion Retailer
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have seen that country managers at Zara constantly deviate
from revenue-maximizing prices during clearance sales. Moreover, their deviations tend to
be skewed towards prices that are lower than the optimal ones (see Figure 3.1).
The way in which managers at Zara deviate from revenue-maximizing prices is compatible
with a number of cognitive biases. One of these is loss aversion. Last chapter’s results show
that Zara country managers are more likely to deviate from the optimal prices when products
have a low salvage value; however, counter to what we expected to find, the size of their
deviations is smaller when the salvage value is low. Thus, it is unclear if loss aversion is what
best explains their pricing behavior. Moreover, loss aversion and salience of inventory are
very difficult to disentangle: do managers really care about the value of unsold inventory, or
only about its amount? How much of each bias do they exhibit?
In this chapter, we build a structural model of managers’ pricing decision making in order
to identify whether they are loss averse and, if so, how much. In our model, managers at Zara
choose prices to maximize their utility over the whole clearance sales season horizon. This
price optimization problem includes some constraints that reflect the firm’s actual pricing
rules during clearance sales, which country managers also follow. The problem’s objective
function, managers’ utility, contains a loss aversion term which depends on a loss aversion
parameter, in the style of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
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Figure 3.1: Decisions made by the managers during the Winter 2010 clearance sales cam-
paigns with respect to the decision support system: 57% of the time, they adhered to the
price recommended by the DSS; when they decided to deviate, 2/3 of the time they set prices
that were lower than the recommended ones.
To calibrate our model and estimate managers’ loss aversion parameter, we use data
collected by Zara in two countries (Belgium and France) during 2007 and 2008 (i.e. before
the decision support system that we studied in the previous chapter was implemented). At
that time, managers chose clearance sales prices based entirely on the old inventory reports,
the coarse heuristic we have described in the last chapter, and their intuition. Therefore,
by using pre-DSS data we can analyze their pricing behavior in the wild and observe any
cognitive biases they may have, without worrying that they might have been subject to the
anchoring effect of the DSS’s recommendations.
We use the data corresponding to the summer of 2007 to calibrate our demand forecast
model, and then use the data from 2008 to estimate the two country managers’ loss aversion
parameter. For each value of this parameter, our model leads to a different set of prices
that the managers would choose if they were maximizing a utility function like the one we
propose. We pick the value of this parameter that provides the closest prices to the ones that
they actually implemented for each product and week. We estimate a separate loss aversion
parameter for each one of the two managers, to whom we refer as Manager B and Manager
F, and for each product group in our data (shirts, pants, etc.).
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We find that, overall, both managers are loss averse (their parameter estimates are greater
than zero), and that Manager F is more loss averse than Manager B. However, we cannot
find any clear pattern in their differences in loss aversion across product groups, such as
being more loss averse for more fashionable products and less loss averse for basic products,
or a relationship between their degree of loss aversion and products’ salvage value.
Our model explains managers’ pricing behavior around 11% better than if we assume
that they are revenue maximizers, and this improvement is larger in product groups for
which their loss aversion is higher (i.e., when the difference between the revenue function
and their loss-averse utility is bigger). We also test whether managers were actually inventory
minimizers, instead of revenue or utility maximizers, but this approach leads to a prediction
error that is several times larger than our model’s.
Given the very small sample size used in this chapter, these results are extremely prelim-
inary and should be interpreted with caution. In §3.6 we provide a detailed list of next steps
necessary for this research project to lead to a finished, publishable paper. In particular, we
ultimately want to estimate the counterfactual revenue that managers at Zara would have
generated if they had not been subject to loss aversion. However, we believe that our model
needs to be improved and estimated with a much larger dataset and more sophisticated
techniques before we can give a reliable estimate of the additional revenue that Zara is not
making due to its managers’ biased pricing behavior.
3.2. Literature Review
Loss aversion is a concept that was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as
one of the components of prospect theory, which they proposed based on empirical results of
laboratory experiments. Since then, this cognitive bias has been experimentally measured
plenty of times (Thaler et al. 1997, Novemsky and Kahneman 2005, Ga¨chter et al. 2007,
Abdellaoui et al. 2007, 2008, Schmidt and Traub 2002), even in non-human subjects such
as capuchin monkeys (Chen et al. 2006). Loss aversion “has the correct psychological foun-
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dation, it is theoretically useful, and it is a parsimonious principle that can explain many
puzzles” (Camerer 2005).
Loss aversion has been observed in many real-life settings, such as consumers’ choice of
brand and product valuation (Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Hardie et al. 1993, Amaldoss
and He 2017), labor supply in markets in which workers can choose how much or how hard
to work (Camerer et al. 1997, Goette et al. 2004, Hossain and List 2012, Imas et al. 2016),
and seller pricing behavior in housing markets (Genesove and Mayer 2001, Engelhardt 2003,
Anenberg 2011). Loss aversion is related to the endowment effect, when individuals demand
a much higher price to sell an item than what they paid for it (Thaler 1980, Kahneman et al.
1991, Ericson and Fuster 2014). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) build on Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) to provide a more general theory and model of loss aversion, and use it to explain the
empirically observed consumer behavior and labor supply puzzles. For a summary of field
evidence supporting prospect theory, see Camerer (1998).
These situations in which agents are loss averse, both in laboratory experiments and in
the field, have one characteristic in common: subjects are not experts. For instance, in labor
markets, a commonly studied group is the taxi drivers. While they are experts in driving,
they are not specialists in labor economics, therefore their deviations from what economic
models predict regarding how many hours they work can be attributed to lack of knowledge
or ability to plan their work schedule optimally. In contrast, a context in which loss aversion
has been observed both in non-experts and experts is the equity premium, or why investors
hold bonds when stocks have a much higher return rate (Benartzi and Thaler 1995, Thaler
et al. 1997, Gneezy and Potters 1997, Gneezy et al. 2003, Haigh and List 2005).
In this chapter, we study loss aversion in pricing behavior in subjects who are, indeed,
experts in pricing. The decision makers in our data are managers at Zara, a large retailer
present in tenths of countries, and these managers are responsible for all the prices during
clearance sales in a whole country each one, i.e., are individuals who hold a great amount
of responsibility in the company and are expected to be very sophisticated in their decision
making processes. Our main contribution to the behavioral literature is that we are able to
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identify and quantify loss aversion in experts.
In the domain of operations management, loss aversion is most usually associated with
sourcing decisions in a newsvendor setting. Experimentally, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000)
find that loss aversion cannot explain decision bias in a newsvendor ordering context. How-
ever, Long and Nasiry (2014) argue that, with the proper choice of reference prices, loss
aversion does explain the results in Schweitzer and Cachon (2000). Uppari and Hasija (2018)
expand the model proposed by Long and Nasiry (2014). A large number of analytical papers
use a newsvendor model where either the newsvendor or the consumers are loss averse, such
as Su (2008), Wang (2010), Zhao and Stecke (2010), Liu et al. (2013), Baron et al. (2015),
Xinsheng et al. (2015), Xu et al. (2017), among others.
Contract theory is another stream of operations management research in which loss aver-
sion has been well studied. Ho and Zhang (2008), Katok and Wu (2009), Davis et al. (2014),
Zhang et al. (2015), Davis (2015) find evidence of loss averse behavior in supply chain con-
tracts using laboratory experiments. In contrast, in another laboratory experiment, loss
aversion fails to explain the observed results (Johnsen et al. 2019). Multiple analytical pa-
pers which study supply chain contracts incorporate loss aversion in one or several agents
(Wang and Webster 2007, Deng et al. 2013, Chen et al. 2014, Hu et al. 2016).
Empirically, consumers’ loss aversion has been also studied in the operations management
field, with applications to assortment planning and pricing (Wang 2018), and the performing
arts industry (Tereyag˘og˘lu et al. 2017).
We study loss aversion in the specific context of pricing. While this has been studied
with regard to consumer behavior (see O¨zer and Zheng (2012)), managers’ cognitive biases
(loss aversion specifically) when setting prices for consumers remain understudied.
By using our unique dataset, we are able to calibrate our mode so it can capture how
actual expert managers set prices in a real company. As mentioned in §3.1, our main contri-
bution is to show that loss aversion is not unique to students who participate in laboratory
experiments, or to unsophisticated individuals like taxi drivers, but that experts also suffer
from this cognitive bias when making high-stakes decisions that have a large, direct impact
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on a firm’s revenue.
3.3. Model
3.3.1 Model Formulation.
Consider a manager who is setting the price pnw for product n = 1, . . . , N on weeks w =
1, . . . ,W of clearance sales. The manager observes how much inventory of n there currently
is, Iˆn0, and estimates how much demand the product will have during each week in the
horizon for every price under consideration, dnw(pnw). The actual demand during week
w, Dnw, will deviate from the expected demand by an uncertain term εnw, so it will be
Dnw = dnw(pnw) + εnw. Furthermore, the maximum number of units that can be sold
corresponds to the inventory levels, as demand cannot be backlogged. Hence, the (uncertain)
sales amount for product n during week w is Snw = min{Dnw, In,w−1}, where In,w is the
(uncertain) inventory level at the end of week w and, by construction, Inw = In,w−1 − Snw.
All inventory that remains unsold at the end of the season, InW , will be salvaged at price ps
(which takes the same value for all products within a group).
Now, if this manager was a pure revenue-maximizer, they would be searching for the
price trajectory pn = (pn1, . . . , pnW ) which maximized the expected revenue of this product
for the whole horizon, so their utility function for product n and a given price path p would
be
Un(Iˆn0,pn) = ES
[
W∑
w=1
pnwSnw + psInW
]
. (3.1)
However, the manager may be loss averse and perceive as a loss each unit that needs to
be salvaged, since salvage values are significantly lower than retail prices. We model loss
aversion by adding a loss aversion term to the utility function, −λ (pn0 − ps) InW , where λ
is the manager’s loss aversion parameter1.
1This form of loss aversion utility is consistent with Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Ericson and Fuster
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Thus, the utility function for product n that the manager will maximize over p is
Un(Iˆn0,pn) = ES
[
W∑
w=1
pnwSnw + psInW − λ (pn0 − ps) InW
]
. (3.2)
We choose, as the reference price for the loss aversion term, the product’s current imple-
mented price, pn0. The choice of the most recently implemented price as a reference point
is well established in the literature (Winer 1986, Popescu and Wu 2007, Bruno et al. 2012).
The parameter λ will show how loss averse the manager is: the closer λ it is to 0, the closer
to a revenue maximizer the manager is. If the manager is loss averse (λ > 0), we will observe
larger deviations from revenue-maximizing prices when the number of units to salvage at
the end of the season InW is large or when the current retail price pn0 is much higher than
the salvage value ps. Notice that this loss averse term of the utility function is not defined
for gains, only for losses; this is because the salvage value is always strictly lower than the
retail price, and so the manager can either feel neutral (λ = 0) or negatively (λ > 0) when
they forecast how many units will remain unsold at the end of the season and evaluate their
value compared to the reference point.
There are a number of company-specific rules that managers at Zara need to follow when
setting prices during clearance sales. The first is that prices cannot increase: pnv ≤ pnw for
every week v > w. The second is that the order of prices across products within a group
is preserved over time: if pnw ≤ pmw, then pnv ≤ pmv for all v > w. Once two product’s
prices coalesce, if the two products belong to the same group, their prices are coupled: if
pnw = pmw, then pnv = pmv for v > w. Finally, all prices need to be drawn from a discrete set
that is pre-defined by the firm’s marketing department: pnw ∈ {p1, . . . , pK} for n = 1, . . . , N
and w = 1, . . . ,W .
Note that the second and third constraints above force the manager to be thinking about
the price of all the products within the same group when setting the price of each individual
product. In other words, these two sets of constraints couple products together when the
(2014). In their more general framework, the loss averse utility function is U = u+µ(u−r), where µ(x) = ηx
for x > 0 and µ(x) = ληx for x ≤ 0 (λ > 1), r is the reference point respect to which the decision maker
evaluates the prospect u.
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manager maximzes their utility. Hence, we need to write the manager’s objective function
as a sum of the individual product utilities,
U(I0,p|λ) =
N∑
n=1
Un(Iˆn0,pn|λ). (3.3)
The problem that the manager solves is:
max
p
ES
[∑W
w=1
∑N
n=1 pnwSnw +
∑N
n=1 psInW − λ
∑N
n=1 (pn0 − ps) InW
]
(3.4)
s.t. pnv ≤ pnw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, v > w (3.5)
pnv ≤ pmv ∀n,m = 1, . . . , N, v > w, s.t. pnw ≤ pmw (3.6)
pnv = pmv ∀n,m = 1, . . . , N, v > w, s.t. pnw = pmw (3.7)
Snw = min{Dnw, In,w−1} ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.8)
Inw = In,w−1 − Snw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 2, . . . ,W (3.9)
In1 = Iˆn0 − Sn1 ∀n = 1, . . . , N (3.10)
pnw ∈ {p1, . . . , pK} ∀n = 1, . . . , N (3.11)
3.3.2 Certainty Equivalent Approximation.
The system described in Equations 3.4 to 3.11 is a dynamic program with a huge state space
(all possible inventory levels for every product in the group) and uncertainty set (all possible
demand levels for every product in the group). It cannot be solved exactly, so we use a
certainty equivalent approximation to deal with it. We substitute the uncertain demand
Dnw = dnw(pnw) + εnw for its expected value E[Dnw] = dnw(pnw), and so the expected sales
are snw = E [Snw] = min{dnw(pnw), inw}, where inw = E [Inw] = Iˆn0 −
∑W
w=1 snw] is the
expected inventory level for product n at the end of week w.
The program that the manager solves every week becomes, then,
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max
p
∑W
w=1
∑N
n=1 pnwsnw +
∑N
n=1 psinW − λ
∑N
n=1 (pn0 − ps) inW (3.12)
s.t. pnv ≤ pnw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, v > w (3.13)
pnv ≤ pmv ∀n,m = 1, . . . , N, v > w, s.t. pnw ≤ pmw (3.14)
pnv = pmv ∀n,m = 1, . . . , N, v > w, s.t. pnw = pmw (3.15)
snw = min{dnw, in,w−1} ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.16)
inw = in,w−1 − snw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 2, . . . ,W (3.17)
in1 = Iˆn0 − sn1 ∀n = 1, . . . , N (3.18)
pnw ∈ {p1, . . . , pK} ∀n = 1, . . . , N (3.19)
3.3.3 Discretization and Linearization.
The last constraint in the system, Equation 3.19, implies that the action set is discrete.
Given that, with the certainty equivalent approximation, we are now solving a deterministic
problem, we can reformulate it as a mixed integer program in the following way: we define
the binary decision variables ynkw, which take value 1 if product n has price pk in week w,
0 otherwise; and the auxiliary variables xnkw = 1 if product n has a price that is equal or
lower than pk in week w, 0 otherwise.
We now need to reformulate the constraints using this discretization. By construction,
xn(k−1)w ≤ xnkw and ynkw = xnkw − xn(k−1)w for all n = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , K, and w =
1, . . . ,W . Products can only be assigned one price, so
∑K
k=0 ynkw ≤ 1. Constraint 3.5 above
becomes xnk(w−1) ≤ xnkw. The ordering of products (Equation 3.14 above) is preserved with
the new constraint xnkw ≤ x(n+1)kw. As mentioned before, one of the company’s rules is that
products whose prices have coalesced will remain coupled for the rest of the season; this rule
(Equation 3.15) means that, if pn0 = pn+1,0, then
∑K
k=0
∑W
w=1 xnkw =
∑K
k=0
∑W
w=1 x(n+1)kw.
The expected sales for every product and week are snw = min
{∑K
k=0 dnkwynkw, inw
}
, and
the inventory flow is formulated as inw = in,w−1 − snw.
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The manager’s optimization problem becomes
max
x,y,s,i
∑W
w=1
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1 pksnkw +
∑N
n=1 psinW −
∑N
n=1 λ (pn0 − ps) inW (3.20)
s.t. snw ≤ dnkwynkw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.21)
snw ≤ inw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.22)
xn,k−1,w ≤ xnkw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 2 . . . , K, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.23)
ynkw = xnkw − xn,k−1,w ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 2 . . . , K, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.24)∑K
k=0 ynkw ≤ 1 ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.25)
xn,k,w−1 ≤ xnkw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 2, . . . ,W (3.26)
xnkw ≤ xn+1,k,w ∀n = 1, . . . , N − 1, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.27)∑K
k=0
∑W
w=1 xnkw =
∑K
k=0
∑W
w=1 xn+1,k,w ∀n s.t. pn0 = pn+1,0, ∀w (3.28)
inw = in,w−1 − snw ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 2, . . . ,W (3.29)
in1 = Iˆn0 − sn1 ∀n = 1, . . . , N (3.30)
snw, inw ≥ 0 ∀n = 1, . . . , N, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.31)
xn,k,w, ynkw ∈ {0, 1} ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K, w = 1, . . . ,W (3.32)
This problem is a mixed integer linear program (MILP). Note that this discretization-
linearization procedure was first proposed in Caro and Gallien (2012).
3.3.4 Demand Estimation.
How does the manager forecast the expected demand of each product for the remaining weeks
in the horizon? We assume that they use the following variation of a constant elasticity
demand function to forecast the first week’s demand:
dn1(pn1) = α
(
dˆn0
)β
eγ(pn1−pn0). (3.33)
In this model, the coefficient γ is customers’ price elasticity, which we expect to be
negative (demand increases when prices decrease, so when pnw < pn0). The factor
(
dˆn0
)β
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captures a state dependence of the demand. In other words, when a product has been having
a high demand in the previous weeks (because it is on trend, or of a higher quality), it is
expected to continue having a high demand than a product with a lower past demand, even
if the two products are marked down by the same amount. The coefficient α acts like a
discount factor, capturing the fact that, regardless of the attractiveness of the product, and
even in the absence of markdowns, prices “get old” (Caro and Gallien 2012). We do not
account for the broken assortment effect, as our data is aggregated at the country level and
not at the store level.
To estimate the parameters of this function we use linear regression. Given that we cannot
observe the uncensored demand that products had, only their realized sales sˆnw, we use this
as the dependent variable, and sales in the previous week as the first independent variable.
By taking logarithms in both sides of Equation 3.33, the linear regression we estimate is
log (sˆnw) = log(α) + β log (sˆn,w−1) + γ (pnw − pn,w−1) . (3.34)
Once we have estimates for parameters α, β and γ, we use them to forecast the first week’s
demand for every possible price pk ∈ {p1, . . . , pK} in the list of feasible prices, dnk1. We then
estimate the demand for the following weeks, for every feasible price, using a discount factor
κ. The demand estimation procedure is, for the discretized problem, as follows:
dnk1 = α
(
dˆn0
)β
eγ(pk−pn0) ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K (3.35)
dnkw = κ
wdnk1 ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K, w = 2, . . . ,W. (3.36)
3.3.5 Weekly Price Implementation.
Following the company’s procedures, the manager solves a problem like the one described in
Equations 3.20-3.32 for every product group at the beginning of each week of clearance sales
and implements the chosen prices for that period, (pˆ11, . . . , pˆN1). A week after, after sales
have been realized, the manager updates their demand forecast and solves the problem again
for w = 2, . . . ,W but implements only week 2’s prices, (pˆ12, . . . , pˆN2). The process continues
until the end of the clearance sales season. This process is done starting in the second week
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of clearance sales (which we denote by w = 1); for the initial markdowns (w = 0) of each
campaign, the process is different, and done by a committee and not by the country manger
alone. We denote by pˆmg = (pˆ11, . . . , pˆN1, . . . , pˆ1W , . . . , pˆNW ) the set of prices that manager
m implemented during the campaign for group g containing products n = 1, . . . , N .
Similarly, we start by observing the realized demand for the first week of clearance sales,
(dˆ10, . . . , dˆN0) for a group containing products n = 1, . . . , N , and estimating the products’ ex-
pected demands for the rest of the campaign as shown in Equations 3.35-3.36. We then solve
the MILP in Equations 3.20 to 3.32 for week w = 1, . . . ,W and store the first week’s optimal
prices, (p∗11, . . . , p
∗
N1). We then use the actual realized demand (from data), (dˆ11, . . . , dˆN1)
to re-estimate the expected demands for weeks w = 2, . . . ,W , solve the MILP again for this
shorter set of weeks, and store (p∗12, . . . , p
∗
N2). We repeat this method to obtain the vector
of optimal prices p∗mg = (p
∗
11, . . . , p
∗
N1, . . . , p
∗
1W , . . . , p
∗
NW ), which contains the prices of group
g’s products that our model predicts to be implemented every week by manager m.
3.3.6 Loss Aversion Parameter Estimation.
Note that the MILP in Equations 3.20 to 3.32 depends on the manager’s loss aversion
parameter, λ, so the vector of optimal prices is actually of the form p∗mg(λ). We now need
to estimate the value of this parameter. To allow for variation in degree of loss aversion not
only between managers, but also between product types (for instance, a manager might be
more loss averse when setting prices for fashion products that are not as easy to sell as basic
products), we estimate a value of λ for every manager and group, λmg.
We do so by line search over λ to minimize the mean absolute percentage error2,
λ∗mg = arg min
W∑
w=1
Ng∑
n=1
100 ·
∣∣∣∣p∗nw(λ)− pˆnwpˆnw
∣∣∣∣ . (3.37)
2When we minimized the sum of squared errors, λ∗mg = arg min
∑W
w=1
∑Ng
n=1 [p
∗
nw(λ)− pˆnw]2, we obtained
very similar values of λ∗mg.
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3.4. Data
To be able to fit our model to best capture managers’ behavior, we used a dataset which
was collected by Zara before the implementation of the decision support system that we
analyzed in the previous chapter. This way, we can be sure that the observed prices that
managers implemented are a result of their own internal decision making process, and not
subject to any effect from the DSS such as anchoring. Our pre-DSS dataset contains two
clearance sales campaigns (summer of 2007 and summer of 2008), in two countries, Belgium
and France. For the remainder of this paper, we will refer to those countries’ managers as
Manager B and Manager F, respectively.
Our dataset contains observations for 9 different product groups (all of them are women’s
apparel). In Zara’s inner jargon, a group is a product type which is targeted towards a specific
consumer group. For instance, there are three groups corresponding to blazers for women:
“blazer - basic”, “blazer - woman”, and “blazer - TRF”. “Basic” products are those which are
made usually in solid, neutral colors, and are less risky and less fashionable. In the opposite
extreme, “TRF” is Zara’s apparel line for younger women. Products in this collection are
meant to be trendy, usually have unique designs, colors or prints, and are more risky for the
company. Between basic and TRF products, “woman” is the product line targeted to adult
women. This collection contains products with non-basic colors, prints or designs, but not
too risky to be worn in a work setting. For example, in last winter’s assortment we found
that basic blazers were black or dark gray, women’s blazers had a discreet print, and the
only TRF blazer was all glittery and sparkly.
Table 3.1 shows how many observations there are (and what percent of the data that
amount accounts for) for every country manager, every campaign, and every product group.
Recall that one of Zara’s pricing rules is that all products (SKUs) in the same group
which have the same price shall be priced together for the remainder of the season. A set of
SKUs with the same price during the regular season is called a cluster. A week-cluster pair
is the smallest unit of observation in our data, as country managers make pricing decisions
90
Num. Observations % Observations
Country manager
Manager B (Belgium) 1,068 47.59
Manager F (France) 1,176 52.41
Clearance sales campaign
Summer 2007 1,024 45.63
Summer 2008 1,220 54.37
Product group
Knitwear 272 12.12
T-shirt 438 19.52
Skirt - TRF 199 8.87
Pants - TRF 324 14.44
Pants - woman 226 10.07
Pants - basic 258 11.50
Blazer - TRF 132 5.88
Blazer - woman 196 8.73
Blazer - basic 199 8.87
Total 2244 100
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of the categorical variables in our data.
at the cluster level (and not each SKU separately)3.
An observation in our dataset is shown in Table 3.2. It corresponds to a pricing decision
made by Manager B (the one setting prices for Belgium) in the Summer 2008 campaign.
This is the 4990 cluster of TRF blazers, i.e, blazers in the TRF collection which were priced
at 49.90e during the regular season. This is the pricing decision made at the beginning of
week 2 of clearance sales; during week 1, this cluster was priced at 29.95e. In week 2, the
manager decides to price it at 19.95e. At the beginning of week 2 there are 724 units of
inventory of this cluster in Belgium, of which 177 are sold during the week. Any units that
remain unsold by the end of clearance sales will be salvaged at 4.74e.
Table 3.3 contains summary statistics of the numerical variables in our dataset.
3In §3.3, index n = 1, . . . , N actually refers to clusters.
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Country Year Season Group Cluster Week
Belgium 2008 Summer Blazer - TRF 4990 2
Initial inventory Quantity sold Regular price Previous price Implemented price Salvage value
724 177 49.90e 29.95e 19.95e 4.74e
Table 3.2: One observation in our dataset.
Mean St. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Inventory per cluster at the beginning of the clearance sales campaign 10,986.59 21,380.55 3,057.50 0 149,487
Weekly sales per cluster 1,058.10 2,707.72 184.50 0 39,686
Inventory per cluster at the end of the clearance sales campaign 1,758.99 3,078.85 580.50 0 17,065
Number of weeks that a cluster is on sale 8.976 1.232 9 7 10
Number of cluster per product group 6.667 2.029 6 2 10
% markdown chosen by the country manager (unconditional) 12.90 17.02 0 0 86.79
% markdown chosen by the country manager (given that he/she decided to markdown) 31.12 11.43 30.15 12.03 86.79
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of the numerical variables in our data. Note that 41.49%
of the time products were marked down, while the remaining 58.51% of the time country
managers decided to keep the previous week’s price.
3.5. Results
3.5.1 Demand Forecast Function Parameters.
We first estimate the demand forecast function parameters using the linear regression de-
scribed in Equation 3.34.
The coefficient estimates of this regression are shown in Table 3.4. From these coefficient
estimates, we compute the parameters of the demand function as α = e−0.099 = 0.906,
β = 0.939, and γ = −0.049. For the demand in weeks w > 1, we use the discount factor
κ = 0.84 as suggested in Caro and Gallien (2012). The demand forecast model is, then,
dnk1 = 0.906 ·
(
dˆn0
)0.939
· e−0.049(pk−pn0) ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K (3.38)
dnkw = 0.84
w · dnk1 ∀n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K, w = 2, . . . ,W. (3.39)
As mentioned in §3.4, we used the observations from 2007 to calibrate the parameters
of the demand forecast function, and the observations from 2008 to estimate managers’ loss
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log(Salesnw)
log(Salesn,w−1) 0.939∗∗∗
(0.012)
Pricenw – Pricen,w−1 −0.049∗∗∗
(0.007)
Intercept −0.099
(0.073)
Observations 840
R2 0.877
Adjusted R2 0.877
Residual Std. Error 0.737 (df = 837)
F Statistic 2,984.965∗∗∗ (df = 2; 837)
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.4: Coefficient estimates of the linear regression (Equation 3.34) of the demand
forecast model.
aversion parameters. We discard the first week of 2007 to be able to use that week’s observed
sales as the lagged observed sales independent variable in the regression (we cannot observe
the pre-clearance sales information in our data). Our final data set with which we estimate
the coefficients of the demand function contains 840 observations. Attempts at estimating
separate demand models for each one of the managers, or product groups, etc. led to spurious
results, such as non-significant coefficients or positive price elasticities, most likely due to
the small sample size.
3.5.2 Loss Aversion Parameter Estimation.
We used the data from 2008 to estimate the value of λmg, the loss aversion parameter of each
manager for every product group. As a preliminary step, we computed the mean absolute
percentage error,
MAPEmg(λ) =
W∑
w=1
Ng∑
n=1
100 ·
∣∣∣∣p∗nw(λ)− pˆnwpˆnw
∣∣∣∣ , (3.40)
for different values of λ (by varying this parameter in small increments). We then plotted
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Skirt Pants Pants Pants Blazer Blazer Blazer
Knitwear T-shirt TRF TRF woman basic TRF woman basic
Manager B 0.613 1.908 0.896 0.083 0.370 0.056 0.138 0.768 0.005
Manager F 1.760 2.305 0.813 1.376 1.201 0.162 1.829 0 2.292
Table 3.5: Estimated value of the loss aversion parameter λmg for every manager and product
group.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of the loss aversion parameter λmg estimates, for Manager B (left)
and Manager F (right), and all product groups.
MAPEmg(λ) to visually inspect if it had only one minimum, and we identified an interval
in which this minimum was contained (for each manager and group). We used this interval
as the initial bounds for the line search of the minimum of MAPEmg on λ.
Table 3.5 contains our λ estimates. These values are also shown in Figure 3.2. The
estimated values of this parameter vary widely (from 0 to 2.305) between country managers
and between product groups. However, from the histograms in Figure 3.2 we can see that
Manager F seems to be more loss averse than Manager B. In particular, Manager B’s esti-
mated λ’s take values below 1 in all groups except two, whereas Manager F’s estimates are
above 1 in six of the nine product groups.
One might suspect that the variation in λ within each country manager is driven by
differences between product groups. However, as we can see in Figure 3.3, there does not
appear to be any clear pattern. Both managers seem to be very loss averse when they are
setting prices for t-shirts (with λ estimates equal to 1.908 for Manager B and 2.305 for
Manager F), moderately loss averse when they set prices for TRF skirts (with parameter
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Figure 3.3: Estimates of the loss aversion parameter λmg, for each manager and product
group. The upper bar (green) of every group corresponds to Manager F, and the lower bar
(pink) corresponds to manager B.
estimates 0.896 and 0.813, respectively), and have very small λ estimates for basic pants
(0.056 and 0.162). These are the only three product groups where both managers seem to
have a similar behavior. An extreme example of this are the three types of blazers: for
TRF blazers, Manager F is very loss averse (λ = 1.829) and Manager B is very little loss
averse (λ = 0.138); for basic blazers, Manager F is even more loss averse (λ = 2.292) and
Manager B is almost not loss averse at all (λ = 0.005); however, we find the opposite order
for women’s blazers, where Manager B’s estimated λ is 0.768, and Manager F’s is 0.
Therefore, from this visual inspection, we cannot draw any clear conclusion on what
product group’s characteristics are driving the differences in loss aversion parameter esti-
mates within each manager. In particular, it is unclear if the trendiness or basicness of a
product group has any relationship with managers’ degree of loss aversion respect to that
group, as the loss aversion parameter estimates for these two broad types of products do not
seem to be distinctively clustered.
A possible explanation of the variation in loss aversion between products may be the
difference in salvage value across groups. However, many different (but related) product
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between the loss aversion parameter λmg and the salvage value smg.
groups share salvage value: for instance, all blazer groups in our data have the same salvage
value, and so do all bottoms (skirts and pants). But, as we have seen, both managers have
different λ estimates for each type of blazer, skirt, etc. We can confirm that the estimates
of the loss aversion parameter have very little correlation with the salvage value of different
product groups by looking at Figure 3.4.
3.5.3 Model Comparison.
Our goal is to model manager’s pricing decisions in a way that explains their actual behavior
better than just assuming that they are perfect revenue maximizers. To test how successful
we were, we repeat the price optimization in Equations 3.20-3.32 for λ = 0. In other words,
we replace the objective function in Equation 3.20 for the following discretization of the
expected revenue:
W∑
w=1
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
pksnkw +
N∑
n=1
psinW . (3.41)
Like in the original problem, we rerun the MILP with this objective function and Con-
straints 3.21-3.32 for every week, updating the demand forecast using the previous week’s
realized sales, and store the first week’s prices (the ones that the manager would implement).
We obtain a vector of revenue-maximizing prices pRmg = (p
R
11, . . . , p
R
N1, . . . , p
R
1W , . . . , p
R
NW ) for
every manager m and froup g. We then compute the mean absolute percentage error for this
price path as
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of the average over groups of MAPEmg, for Manager B (left) and
Manager F (right). In each plot, the fist bar (blue) corresponds to the error in our loss-averse
utility maximization model, MAPE∗mg, while the second bar (orange) corresponds to the
error in the revenue maximization model, MAPERmg.
MAPERmg =
W∑
w=1
Ng∑
n=1
100 ·
∣∣∣∣pRnw − pˆnwpˆnw
∣∣∣∣ , (3.42)
where pˆnw is the price that manager m set for product n in week w, as observed in our
data.
Figure 3.5 shows a comparison between the average over all groups of MAPERmg and
the average over groups of MAPE∗mg, our loss-averse utility maximization model’s error
(Equation 3.37). As we can see, our model’s error is lower than that of revenue maximization:
for Manager B, the average MAPER is 13.20, while the average MAPE∗ is 11.96; for
Manager F, the average MAPER is 17.96, while the average MAPE∗ is 15.93. If we take
the average over all the groups and country managers of the ratio MAPE∗ig/MAPE
R
ig, we
find that our model explains managers’ behavior 11.04% better, on average, than assuming
that managers are revenue maximizers.
The exact values of the mean absolute percentage error, for each group and manager, are
shown in Table 3.6. Figure 3.6 shows a histogram of our model’s percentage improvement
respect to revenue maximization. In six manager-group pairs, our model improves revenue
maximization by an amount that is lower than 5%; in four cases, the improvement is between
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Figure 3.6: Histogram of the percentage improvement (from modeling managers’ behavior
as a revenue maximization to doing so as a loss-averse utility maximization), for all country
managers and product groups.
5% and 10%; in the remaining eight cases, our model explains manager’s behavior more than
10% better than revenue maximization. In two of these eight cases, the improvement is higher
than 40%.
What makes our model better at explaining managers’ price decision making than revenue
maximization in some cases, and not so different in others? A possible explanation is that,
for groups in which the loss aversion coefficient estimate λ is higher, the improvement is
also higher, as the objective function is further from revenue (compared to when λ is small).
Indeed, in Figure 3.7 we can see that there is a positive correlation between the loss aversion
parmeter estimate and the percentage improvement that our model offers respect to revenue
maximization.
Our hypotheses that managers were loss averse, and not revenue maximizers, arose from
observing that they were setting overly aggressive markdowns, as if they were trying to
minimize the amount of unsold inventory at the end of the season. What if their actual
objective was as simple as minimizing inventory, and not maximizing their loss-averse utility?
We repeat the price optimization procedure given by the MILP in Equations 3.20-3.32
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between the percentage improvement from using a loss-averse util-
ity maximization model (respect to a revenue maximization model) and the loss aversion
parameter λmg, for all country managers and product groups.
but we replace the problem’s objective, Equation 3.20, for
min
x,y,s,i
∑N
n=1 inW . (3.43)
Like before, we store the first week’s optimal prices for every weekly run of the algorithm,
and obtain the vector of inventory-minimizing prices pImg = (p
I
11, . . . , p
I
N1, . . . , p
I
1W , . . . , p
I
NW )
for manager m and group g. The mean absolute percentage error between this vector of
prices and the actually implemented prices is MAPEImg.
As we can see in Figure 3.8, this model explains managers’ behavior visibly worse than
both loss-averse utility maximization and revenue maximization, with average across groups
equal to 54.2 (Manager B) and 53.1 (Manger F). Table 3.6 shows the exact MAPEImg for
every manager and group.
3.6. Conclusion and Next Steps
As we had seen in the previous chapter, country managers at Zara choose prices during
clearance sales in a way that deviates from the revenue-maximizing price path, and more
than 60% of the time they do so by setting overly aggressive markdowns, i.e., prices that
are below the optimal ones. As we saw, this behavior is consistent with loss aversion: their
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the mean across groups of MAPEmg, for Manager B (left) and
Manager F (right). In each plot, the fist bar (blue) corresponds to our loss-averse utility
maximization model, the second bar (orange) corresponds to a revenue maximization model,
and the third bar (purple) corresponds to an inventory minimization model.
Skirt Pants Pants Pants Blazer Blazer Blazer
Knitwear T-shirt TRF TRF woman basic TRF woman basic
Manager B
Utility Max. 15.58 5.50 12.79 8.89 16.81 12.43 8.14 17.69 9.78
Revenue Max. 17.59 10.25 14.23 9.13 17.31 12.33 10.54 17.69 9.74
Inventory Min. 69.98 74.85 65.06 62.54 48.13 66.65 50.36 26.04 24.10
Manager F
Utility Max. 13.93 19.93 16.60 11.30 16.09 13.32 8.73 26.61 16.88
Revenue Max. 18.93 23.29 19.29 11.58 16.59 13.32 14.31 26.61 17.71
Inventory Min. 57.53 58.30 61.58 51.68 41.15 62.79 57.62 35.67 51.64
Table 3.6: Comparison of the mean absolute percentage error MAPEmg of the utility maxi-
mization model we propose in §3.3 and the revenue maximization and inventory minimization
models suggested above, for every manager and product group.
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probability of deviating from the revenue-maximizing prices is higher when the products’
salvage value is low, which suggests that they are concerned not only about the amount
of unsold inventory at the end of the season, but more specifically about the value of this
unsold inventory.
Given that salvage values are significantly lower than retail prices or even clearance sales
prices, managers may perceive having to salvage every unit of inventory as a loss, compared
to how much more revenue that item would have made if it had been sold during clearance
sales. Given that the decision support system that was suggesting revenue-maximizing prices
to mangers already took into account what the salvage value of each product was, deviating
from such prices in relation to the salvage value suggests that managers were overestimating
the importance of the loss from salvaging products, i.e., they were loss averse.
To test whether their deviations from revenue-maximizing prices were driven by loss
aversion, we build a structural model of managers’ pricing decision making. In our model,
country managers at Zara who set prices during clearance sales optimize their utility func-
tion, which includes a loss aversion term. The model’s constraints reflect the company’s
actual pricing rules. We use a certainty equivalent approximation to deal with the very high
dimensionality of the problem, and a discretization based on the discrete list of prices that
managers are allowed to use. We compute the loss aversion parameter λmg that leads to the
price path which is the closest to the prices that the managers actually chose.
We estimate the model’s parameters using a small dataset collected by the company
before the decision support system was implemented, so that we can observe managers’
preferred prices without the anchoring effect that the DSS may be introducing. Our dataset
contains nine product groups, sold during two separate clearance sales campaigns (spring
summer of 2007 and 2008), in two countries, Belgium and France. Because of the small size
of this dataset, all the results presented in the paper are extremely preliminary and need to
be interpreted with caution.
Our initial results suggest that the two country managers (to whom we refer as Manager
B and Manager F, respectively) were, indeed, loss averse, to a degree that varies widely by
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product group. Manager B’s loss aversion parameters are generally lower than Manager F’s,
which suggests that they were less loss averse than their French counterpart. Our model’s
mean absolute percentage error, averaged over all groups and managers, is approximately
11% lower than that of a revenue maximization model, and several times lower than if we
assume managers were inventory minimizers. To summarize, our model is promising in that
it can explain managers’ pricing behavior more accurately than a revenue maximization
model can.
As mentioned above, the dataset we used to calibrate our model is very small. Our most
immediate next step would be to use a larger dataset and observe whether our preliminary
results still hold. There are two possible options for extending the size of our sample: the first
one is to use additional pre-DSS data from a few other countries (which were the control
groups when the DSS’s pilot test was performed). This dataset still contains prices that
managers set without the influence of the DSS’s recommendation. However, this is not a
large dataset either. Moreover, it would require a cleaning, organizing and consolidating
effort, as the different variables are contained in several different spreadsheets with little
information to link them together.
The second option is to use the same dataset we used in the previous chapter, and assume
that, when managers deviated, the prices they chose reflect their inner price choices (with a
small anchoring effect from the DSS), but when they adhered we cannot observe their true
price preferences. In other words, we could use this dataset by ignoring the observations in
which they adhered to the DSS’s recommendations, and use only the instances in which they
deviated. This approach would allow us to build counterfactuals for what prices they would
have set if they had not adhered to the DSS’s recommendations, and estimate the gain in
revenue for Zara over all the countries (not only the two participating in the pilot test) from
having implemented the DSS.
Our model greatly relies on the ability to forecast demand, so the demand estimation
method needs to be improved. The parameters of the current function need to be estimated
using a larger amount of data, which would possibly allow us to use different price elasticities
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for different product groups or for different countries. In addition, other functional forms of
the demand forecast should be tested. In the most immediate future, we will estimate the
current function’s parameters with the current dataset using nonlinear least squares instead
of linear regression and ordinary least squares on the demand’s logarithm.
Similarly, we will use nonlinear least squares to be able to not only estimate the values
of λ but also to obtain standard errors of our estimates. However, the small sample sizes
(we are estimating one value of λ for each manager and group) might still lead to large
standard errors even when a parameter is significant, so this should be done after expanding
our dataset as explained above.
The choice of the last implemented price as a reference price for the loss aversion part of
the utility function is rooted in the current literature (Winer 1986, Popescu and Wu 2007,
Bruno et al. 2012). However, there is some evidence that consumers use a more complex
reference point for prices, namely a combination of the most recent and the lowest price
(Nasiry and Popescu 2011). In the future, we need to explore alternative reference prices
like a combination of the most recent and the highest price (the best one from the manager’s
perspective). Other structural estimation experts have suggested that we could estimate the
reference prices as model parameters.
In previous discussions of this project, the utility function contained a loss aversion term
for every week in the horizon. In other words, we assumed managers do not only perceive
as a loss having to salvage inventory, but also having to implement markdowns. However,
we found that the current version of the utility function did a better job at explaining
managers’ behavior. In addition, the computation times for the old, more complex mode
were significantly longer than for the one we have presented here.
Ultimately, the goal of structural estimation is to allow us to build counterfactuals in non-
experimental settings. In our case, as the final next step, we aim to estimate the revenue
that could have been made if managers were not biased or, more specifically, not loss averse.
An initial attempt at doing so yields the following result: the two managers in our dataset
were generating a revenue that was 1.8% lower than what they would have done had they
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been perfect revenue maximizers. Nevertheless, we think that, before trusting this estimate,
we need to ensure that the demand is forecasted more accurately, the loss aversion parameter
is estimated more carefully, and that we use data from more countries (i.e., more managers)
to get a more representative picture of the situation we are analyzing.
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APPENDIX A
Robustness Checks for Chapter 1
A.1. Robustness Checks for Section 1.5
A.1.1 Collinearity.
In Table A.1 we can see the correlation matrix for the order-level variables of our model
and, in Table A.2, the variation inflation factors (VIF) for the regression without cate-
gory/time/buyer dummies. The largest VIF corresponds to the order size control and is
4.31, which is much lower than the usual rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Wooldridge 2015).
In the case of the full-dummies model, as expected, the VIFs (not reported here) are much
higher for the dummy variables, as there is a high correlation between the different outcomes
of the same categorical variable, but also between buyers and categories (for instance, some
buyers only ordered shirts, or pants, etc.).
Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) RelPriceFC 1
(2) PropThisCategory 0.0102+ 1
(3) BuyerIsMajorBrand 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 1
(4) LogOrderSize -0.0718∗∗∗ -0.0104+ 0.0167∗∗ 1
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) RelPriceFC 1
(2) PropThisCategory 0.0207∗∗ 1
(3) BuyerIsMajorBrand 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗∗ 1
(4) LogOrderSize -0.0813∗∗∗ -0.0928∗∗∗ 0.0165∗ 1
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.1: Correlation matrices of the model’s variables. All sample (left), type B factories
(right).
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VIF
All sample
Variable VIF 1/VIF
LogOrderSize 4.31 0.231908
PropThisCategory 3.05 0.327687
USCi,j−1 2.07 0.483542
BuyerIsMajorBrand 1.04 0.961219
RelPriceFC 1.01 0.986433
Mean VIF 2.29
VIF
Subsample
Variable VIF 1/VIF
LogOrderSize 4.31 0.232132
PropThisCategory 3.50 0.285977
USCi,j−1 1.59 0.629142
BuyerIsMajorBrand 1.04 0.957988
RelPriceFC 1.01 0.992310
Mean VIF 2.29
Table A.2: Variation inflation factors of the Arellano-Bond regression for all the data set
(left) and the type B factories’ subsample (right).
A.1.2 Autocorrelation.
The Arellano-Bond estimator assumes that the differenced errors are correlated at most with
order 1, i.e., ρ(∆εit,∆εi,t−1) will not be zero, as both differences contain εi,t−1, but it is nec-
essary that ρ(∆εit,∆εis) = 0, for t− s > 1. We run the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
with order up to 5 for both the all-data and the type B factories’ subsample estimates. The
z-statistics and its corresponding p-values are shown in Table A.3. We reject H0 (no autocor-
relation) at order 1, but fail to reject it at higher orders. Therefore, the no-autocorrelation
assumption of the model is satisfied.
H0: no autocorrelation
All sample
Order z p
1 -3.0464 0.0023
2 1.4372 0.1507
3 -1.1044 0.2694
4 0.95331 0.3404
5 -1.3021 0.1929
H0: no autocorrelation
Subsample
Order z p
1 -2.9779 0.0029
2 1.4067 0.1595
3 -1.1162 0.2643
4 0.95473 0.3397
5 -1.2944 0.1955
Table A.3: Arellano-Bond test for serially correlated errors, for the model using all the data
set (left) and the subsample of type B factories (right).
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A.1.3 Joint Significance of the Order-level Variables.
A distinctive aspect of our study is that we have order-level information. Though some of
the order-level variables are not always statistically significant on their own, when considered
jointly they become highly significant, which is testament to the order-by-order discretion
followed by some factories.
We test the joint significance of the order-level variables by considering nested subsam-
ples of the data based on the average level of unauthorized subcontracting USCi. First, we
consider the full dataset; then, type B factories, i.e., 0 < USCi < 1; after that, factories that
subcontracted more than 10% of the orders but less than 90%; finally, factories that subcon-
tracted more than 20% but less than 80% of their orders. We report the χ2 statistics and the
corresponding p-values in Table A.4. We can see that, for each subset, the order variables
gain in significance, suggesting that factories that have a less defined subcontracting behav-
ior (less polarized towards 0% or 100%) are more sensitive to order-specific characteristics
when making a subcontracting decision.
Joint significance tests
H0: order-level variables are jointly insignificant
Factories All Type B 10% < USCi < 90% 20% < USCi < 80%
Model with order-level variables only
χ2 124.09 600.06 617.82 614.21
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 32028 18646 11813 10879
USCi,j−1 0.297∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
Model with order-level and dummy variables
χ2 22.46 30.53 58.62 78.85
p 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 32028 18646 11813 10879
USCi,j−1 0.295∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
Table A.4: Joint significance of the order-level variables for the Arellano-Bond estimates. The
top panel is for the model with order-level variables only (RelPriceFC, PropThisCategory,
BuyerIsMajorBrand) and the bottom panel is for the model with RelPriceFC, PropThisCat-
egory, and dummies.
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A.1.4 Alternative Model Specifications.
We test our hypotheses using two different regression types. First, the Hsiao estimator, which
is constructed in the same way as the Arellano-Bond, but is estimating using 2SLS instead of
GMM. The coefficients in this estimation and their significance are very similar to those of the
Arellano-Bond regression (Table A.5). To account for the fact that the dependent variable is
binary, we also use a binary outcome model: the random effects dynamic probit (Wooldridge
2010). The coefficient and APE estimates, shown in Table A.6, are fairly robust to those
of the Arellano-Bond estimation. Unfortunately, this model does not allow for an easy IV
approach, so the coefficient estimates are likely affected by some degree of endogeneity. It
does not allow for the inclusion of category, buyer and time dummy variables.
Unauthorized subcontracting
Hsiao
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USCi,j−1 0.271∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0649) (0.0630) (0.0619)
RelPriceFC -0.0729∗ -0.0732∗ -0.0732∗ -0.0719∗
(0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0353) (0.0352)
PropThisCategory 0.0145 -0.00294 -0.000219 -0.00135
(0.0329) (0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0345)
BuyerIsMajorBrand -0.0497∗ -0.0550∗ -0.0601∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0217) (0.0233)
LogOrderSize -0.00215∗ -0.00211∗ -0.00245∗∗ -0.00231∗∗
(0.000843) (0.000833) (0.000906) (0.000860)
Category dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies No No Yes Yes
Buyer dummies No No No Yes
N 32028 32028 32028 32028
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Unauthorized subcontracting
Hsiao
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USCi,j−1 0.271∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.0653) (0.0649) (0.0624) (0.0613)
RelPriceFC -0.110∗ -0.114∗ -0.112∗ -0.106∗
(0.0496) (0.0491) (0.0481) (0.0482)
PropThisCategory 0.0296 -0.0104 -0.0149 -0.0183
(0.0696) (0.0702) (0.0695) (0.0701)
BuyerIsMajorBrand -0.0847∗ -0.105+ -0.121∗
(0.0431) (0.0551) (0.0609)
LogOrderSize -0.00337∗ -0.00337∗ -0.00344∗ -0.00337∗
(0.00140) (0.00139) (0.00147) (0.00138)
Category dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies No No Yes Yes
Buyer dummies No No No Yes
N 18646 18646 18646 18646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.5: Hsiao regression using all the data set (left) and subsampling for type B factories
(right).
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Unauthorized subcontracting
Dynamic random effects probit
All sample Subsample
Coefficients APEs Coefficients APEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USCi,j−1 1.780∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0116) (0.0281) (0.0182)
RelPriceFC -0.220∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.0504∗∗∗
(0.0513) (0.00460) (0.0514) (0.0118)
PropThisCategory 0.249∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗
(0.0628) (0.00559) (0.0629) (0.0145)
BuyerIsMajorBrand -0.235∗ -0.0201∗ -0.234∗ -0.0532∗
(0.105) (0.00907) (0.105) (0.0239)
LogOrderSize -0.00379 -0.000324 -0.00405 -0.000920
(0.00896) (0.000767) (0.00898) (0.00204)
USCi1 3.445
∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.0123) (0.168) (0.0357)
Mean RelPriceFC -1.353 -0.116 0.616 0.140
(1.171) (0.100) (1.207) (0.274)
Mean PropThisCategory -0.862+ -0.0738+ -0.528 -0.120+
(0.449) (0.0391) (0.322) (0.0727)
Mean BuyerIsMajorBrand -3.631 -0.311 -0.176 -0.0400
(3.794) (0.321) (5.013) (1.136)
Mean LogOrderSize 0.0871 0.00746 0.0284 0.00644
(0.132) (0.0113) (0.124) (0.0281)
Constant -3.253∗∗∗ -1.081
(0.910) (0.860)
ln(σ2u) 0.780
∗∗∗ -0.917∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.190)
N 32028 32028 18646 18646
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.6: Dynamic probit regression using all the data set (columns 1 and 2) and the
subsample of type B factories (columns 3 and 4). Odd columns contain coefficients, even
columns contain APEs.
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APPENDIX B
Robustness Checks for Chapter 2
B.1. Screenshots of the DSS’s Interface
Figure B.1 shows one of the legacy inventory reports on which managers used to base their
decisions before the DSS’s implementation. Figure B.2 shows the DSS’s interface after the
interventions.
Figure B.1: One of the weekly inventory and sales reports on which managers based their
pricing decisions before the DSS’s implementation. The last two columns correspond to the
rotation and success (see Section 2.3.2).
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Figure B.2: The DSS’s interface after the interventions. The top area contains the inventory
and sales reports. The bottom left area contains the price recommendation and the managers’
confirmed price, and their respective revenue and sales forecasts (for different horizons). The
bottom right area contains what was added during the interventions: the Y metric for that
group and country (first column of the tables), plus the Y metric for that group and country
in the same week of the previous year as a reference point (second column), and at the end
of the season corresponding to the reference point (third column).
B.2. Robustness Checks for Section 2.4
B.2.1 Difference-in-Differences Regression for a No-Intervention Period
The two interventions performed by Zara took place in a spring-summer campaign. There-
fore, all our DiD analyses of the effect of the interventions contain one fall-winter season as
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pre-intervention period, and one spring-summer season as post-intervention. Potentially, our
results could be capturing only a seasonality trend in adherence behavior. In other words, it
could happen that managers consistently adhere more in spring-summer than in fall-winter,
for reasons that are unrelated to the interventions, such as reacting to different purchasing
behavior from consumers in different times of the year, or others. Note that we find a smaller
effect of Intervention 1 than of Intervention 2, and no effect at all of Intervention 1 on fran-
chises compared to own-store countries, which shows that the time at which Intervention 2
occurred was different from Intervention 1’s.
To strengthen our analysis and to rule out the possibility of a consistent seasonality
effect, we run the previous DiD analyses using data from W2012 and S2013, exactly a
year after the two campaigns we use to study Intervention 2, but this time no intervention
took place. If there is no seasonality effect, and the previous results can be attributed to
the interventions, then here we expect to see no significant difference in adherence, and in
probability of marking down conditional on the DSS recommending keep, because there was
no intervention. In this regression, the three different splits between control and treated are
identical to those in Intervention 2’s regression, and the time variable (equivalent to Int2t
in Intervention 2’s analysis), called Timet, takes value 0 in W2012, 1 in S2013.
The results of this robustness check are in Table B.1. Indeed, all the DiD coefficients of
interest are statistically insignificant. This shows that there is no seasonality effect such that
managers’ adherence behavior is intrinsically different in spring-summer and in fall-winter.
Notice, too, that the Franchise binary variable’s coefficient is also statistically insignif-
icant, which was not the case when we studied the interventions. This shows that, after
the interventions, franchise managers’ adherence behavior was similar to that of own-store
country managers.
B.2.2 Fixed-Effects Linear Regression with Intervention Indicators
As an additional robustness check, we run two fixed effects (within-country) linear regres-
sions: one has Adherenceitg as dependent variable, and the other one has the probability
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No intervention
Adherence
(1) (2) (3)
Time 0.000644 0.00517 -0.00927
(0.00848) (0.00997) (0.0133)
Franchise -0.0279
(0.0155)
Time×Franchise -0.0243
(0.0169)
LowAdherence75 -0.0665∗∗∗
(0.0154)
Time×LowAdherence75 -0.0191
(0.0141)
LowAdherence90 -0.0733∗∗∗
(0.0198)
Time×LowAdherence90 -0.0000169
(0.0160)
Constant 0.630∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.00939) (0.0129) (0.0182)
N 2996 2996 2996
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
No intervention
CMarkdown
(1) (2) (3)
Time -0.00595 0.0103 0.0141
(0.00955) (0.0106) (0.0154)
Franchise -0.0177
(0.0166)
Time×Franchise 0.0231
(0.0154)
LowAdherence75 0.0242
(0.0192)
Time×LowAdherence75 -0.00741
(0.0137)
LowAdherence90 0.0316
(0.0286)
Time×LowAdherence90 -0.0103
(0.0172)
Constant 0.264∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0166) (0.0273)
N 2996 2996 2996
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.1: Change in managers’ adherence (left) and in managers’ probability of marking
a product down when the DSS recommended keeping its price unchanged (right), as a DiD
regression, using data from fall-winter 2012 and spring-summer 2013, when the company
did not perform any intervention. In each regression, the first column corresponds to the
DiD estimator when own-store countries are the control and franchises are the treated; the
second column, when managers in the top quartile of pre-intervention adherence are control;
the third column, when the top decile of pre-intervention adherence are control.
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of marking a product down when the DSS recommended keeping its price unchanged, or
CMarkdownitg. Both contain indicator variables which take value 1 after each intervention
had taken place, and a number of control variables: the number of stores in that coun-
try (LogNumStoresit), the number of campaigns the manager has been using the DSS
(ExperienceWithDSSit), the salvage value (SalvageV alueitg in euros), and season (fall-
winter or spring-summer) and product group dummies. The data used in this regression is,
like in the DiD case, aggregated at the group-campaign level, i.e., the adherence and proba-
bility of marking down are averaged for all weeks in a campaign and all product categories
in a group, and contains all campaigns from W2010 to W2013.
The results of this pair of regressions, shown in Table B.2, are robust to those of our DiD
analysis: Intervention 1 had no significant, robust effect, but Intervention 2 did, and it was
all driven by franchises. Intervention 2 increased franchises’ adherence and decreased their
likelihood of marking down a product against the DSS’s recommendations.
B.3. Robustness Checks for Section 2.5
B.3.1 Limitations of the Heckman Estimator
The Heckman estimator models a two-step decision like the one that managers at Zara faced:
first, whether to deviate from the DSS’s recommendation or not; second, if they deviated, by
how much. Moreover, it is a useful estimator for any setting in which the dependent variable
follows a continuous distribution but has a few points with non-zero mass (Wooldridge 2010).
In our case, the magnitude of deviations has a large mass at AbsDeviationwc = 0, which
makes this a well-suited model for our setting. The fact that the Mills ratio has a significant
coefficient estimate in our results shows the need to account for this type of two-step process.
However, this estimator does not take into account the panel nature of our data: relatively
few (84) country managers made multiple decisions over time (around 3,500 on average).
The covariance matrix correction proposed by Heckman (1977) does take into account some
sources of heteroskedasticity, but not serial correlation between each cross-section. In this
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Adherence
All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3)
Int1 -0.00217 -0.0142 0.0257
(0.0122) (0.00858) (0.0257)
Int2 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.00158 0.120∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0122) (0.0242)
ExperienceWithDSS 0.00523 0.00853∗∗ -0.000182
(0.00284) (0.00270) (0.00512)
LogNumStores -0.00666 -0.000260 0.0465
(0.0267) (0.0254) (0.0372)
SalvageValue -0.00586∗∗ -0.000918
(0.00178) (0.00493)
Franchise 0.0586∗∗∗
(0.0153)
Constant 0.509∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.0507) (0.0782) (0.0457)
N 10431 5639 4792
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
CMarkdown
All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3)
Int1 -0.00610 0.0186 -0.0797∗
(0.0154) (0.0115) (0.0306)
Int2 -0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0140 -0.223∗∗∗
(0.0210) (0.0113) (0.0326)
ExperienceWithDSS -0.00881∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ -0.00209
(0.00278) (0.00297) (0.00429)
LogNumStores 0.0462 0.00372 -0.0333
(0.0425) (0.0288) (0.0424)
SalvageValue 0.00521∗ -0.00115
(0.00221) (0.00368)
Franchise -0.0458
(0.0437)
Constant 0.379∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗
(0.0781) (0.0763) (0.0498)
N 10275 5598 4677
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.2: Regression of managers’ adherence (left) and of managers’ probability of marking
a product down when the DSS recommended keeping its price unchanged (right), as a fixed
effects (within-country) linear regression with intervention indicator variables plus controls.
In each regression, the first column corresponds to all country managers; the second column,
to managers in from countries in which Zara owns the stores; the third column, to franchise
countries. Not reported: season and group dummy variables.
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section, we repeat each part of the Heckman estimator using panel data-specific methods
which correct for serial correlation.
B.3.2 Probability of Deviating as a Fixed Effects Linear Probability Model
The first part that we test is the selection part. In the Heckman estimator, this is modeled
like a pooled probit, where the binary Deviatedwc is the dependent variable. The panel
data-specific equivalent of this would be a random effects probit model, or a fixed effects
or random effects logit model, to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable.
However, given the large size of the data, and the number of dummy variables to include as
controls (group, week, season, year), this becomes computationally infeasible.
Instead, we run a simple linear probability model, with Deviatedwc as dependent variable,
within-country fixed effects, and all covariates and controls that we included in the selection
part of the Heckman estimator (except country dummies, given that now the dependent
variable has its country average subtracted). The errors are clustered at the country level,
correcting for any possible serial correlation.
Table B.3 shows the results of this regression. We observe that DisagreeDSSwc and
DisagreeDSSwg, for franchises, are statistically significant, and that the number of cate-
gories in the group is only statistically significant after Intervention 2. For own-store coun-
tries, DisagreeDSSwc, DisagreeDSSwg and RelSalvageV alue are statistically significant.
Moreover, all the statistically significant coefficients in this table have values that are very
similar to their equivalent APE in the selection part of the Heckman regression. These results
provide robustness to our coefficient and APE estimates in the Heckman model’s selection
part.
B.3.3 Magnitude of Price Deviations as a Fixed Effects Linear Model
Analogously to the previous section, we run a within-country fixed effects linear regression
using the continuous variable AbsDeviationwc using the same covariates and controls that
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Deviated
All countries Own stores Franchises All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline*DisagreeDSSc 0.177
∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.0715
(0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0529)
Int1*DisagreeDSSc 0.113
∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ -0.0226
(0.0194) (0.0115) (0.0364)
Int2*DisagreeDSSc 0.0745
∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.0146
(0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0154)
Baseline*DisagreeDSSg 0.228
∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.0219) (0.0203) (0.0583)
Int1*DisagreeDSSg 0.132
∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ -0.0146
(0.0205) (0.0120) (0.0377)
Int2*DisagreeDSSg 0.0847
∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.0175
(0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0194)
Baseline*RelSalvageValue -0.838∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗ -0.731∗∗∗
(0.0765) (0.0742) (0.0747) (0.0688)
Int1*RelSalvageValue -0.805∗∗∗ -0.926∗∗∗ -0.777∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0655) (0.0553) (0.0633)
Int2*RelSalvageValue -0.681∗∗∗ -1.043∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ -1.010∗∗∗
(0.0504) (0.0394) (0.0494) (0.0393)
Baseline*NumCategs -0.0113 0.0102 -0.00865 -0.0129∗ 0.00965 -0.0109
(0.00573) (0.00509) (0.0138) (0.00589) (0.00509) (0.0139)
Int1*NumCategs -0.00270 0.00796 -0.000910 -0.00265 0.00758 -0.000736
(0.00291) (0.00399) (0.00382) (0.00288) (0.00395) (0.00375)
Int2*NumCategs 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗
(0.00185) (0.00378) (0.00209) (0.00187) (0.00370) (0.00215)
ExperienceWithDSS -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.000890 -0.0249∗ -0.0249∗∗∗ 0.00225 -0.0249∗
(0.00525) (0.00504) (0.00945) (0.00532) (0.00479) (0.00943)
LogNumStores 0.00849 0.00434 -0.0186 0.00876 0.00347 -0.0187
(0.0192) (0.0207) (0.0281) (0.0193) (0.0217) (0.0281)
Franchise -0.0469 -0.0467
(0.0244) (0.0243)
Constant 0.673∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗
(0.0523) (0.0633) (0.0688) (0.0529) (0.0639) (0.0688)
N 294386 169137 125249 294386 169137 125249
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.3: Coefficients of a fixed effects (within-country) linear regression of the decision to
deviate from the DSS’s recommended price. Not reported: week, season, year, and group
dummy variables.
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we used for the deviation part of the Heckman estimator. Given that the decision not to
deviate would bias our results (because in the Heckman regression the Mills ratio has a
statistically significant coefficient), we need to take into account only the times in which
managers decided to deviate, i.e., we run this regression using only the subsample of data in
which Deviatedwc = 1.
Table B.4 shows the coefficient estimates. We can see that the variable StockoutWeekwg,
computed at the group-aggregate level, is almost never statistically significant. Other than
this one, the rest of covariates (StockoutWeekwc and RelSalvageV aluewc) show the same
significance and similar values to their equivalents in the Heckman model’s deviation part,
which strengthens our previous estimates’ robustness.
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AbsDeviation
All countries Own stores Franchises All countries Own stores Franchises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline*StockoutWeekc 0.00616
∗∗∗ 0.00699∗∗ 0.00698∗∗∗
(0.00160) (0.00222) (0.00158)
Int1*StockoutWeekc 0.00113 0.00637
∗∗∗ 0.000499
(0.000574) (0.00140) (0.000656)
Int2*StockoutWeekc 0.00464
∗∗∗ 0.00676∗∗∗ 0.00435∗∗∗
(0.000779) (0.00113) (0.00103)
Baseline*StockoutWeekg 0.00286 0.00248 0.00793
∗∗
(0.00212) (0.00279) (0.00274)
Int1*StockoutWeekg -0.000793 0.00186 -0.000410
(0.000531) (0.00101) (0.000627)
Int2*StockoutWeekg 0.00129
∗ 0.00274∗ 0.00139
(0.000641) (0.00117) (0.000762)
Baseline*RelSalvageValue 0.127∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.0451) (0.0479) (0.0457) (0.0509)
Int1*RelSalvageValue 0.183∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0400) (0.0419) (0.0412)
Int2*RelSalvageValue -0.102 0.0178 -0.0920 0.0275
(0.0608) (0.0668) (0.0626) (0.0695)
ExperienceWithDSS 0.00590 0.00126 0.00836 0.00830∗ 0.00188 0.0146∗∗
(0.00320) (0.00431) (0.00415) (0.00344) (0.00483) (0.00436)
LogNumStores -0.0347 -0.0473 -0.0127 -0.0379 -0.0468 -0.0181
(0.0251) (0.0380) (0.0220) (0.0243) (0.0394) (0.0201)
Franchise -0.0385 -0.0405∗
(0.0203) (0.0195)
Constant 0.391∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.0558) (0.104) (0.0378) (0.0562) (0.111) (0.0383)
N 109619 59844 49775 109619 59844 49775
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.4: Coefficients of a fixed effects (within-country) linear regression of the magnitude
of price deviations, conditional on having decided to deviate (i.e., using only the subsample
of observations in which the manager did not adhere to the DSS’s recommendation). Not
reported: week, season, year, and group dummy variables.
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